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ABSTRACT 
 
Today’s best intelligent, adaptive, multimedia trainers have shown excellent 
performance; however, their results still fall far-short of what good human tutors can achieve. 
The overarching thesis of this paper is that future intelligent, adaptive systems will be improved 
by taking into account relevant, consistent, and meaningful individual differences. Specifically, 
responding to individual differences among trainees will (a) form more accurate individual 
baselines within a training system, and (b) better inform system responses (so that they interpret 
and respond to observable data more appropriately). One variable to consider is trait arousability, 
which describes individual differences in sensitivity to stimuli. Individuals’ arousability interacts 
with the arousal inherent to a task/environment to create a person’s arousal state. An individual’s 
arousal state affects his/her attentional capacity, working memory function, and depth of 
processing.  
In this paper, two studies are presented. The purpose of the first study was to evaluate 
existing subjective measures of trait arousability and then develop a new measure by factor 
analyzing existing apparatus. From this well-populated (N = 622) study, a new reliable (α = .91) 
35-item scale was developed. This scale includes two factors, negative emotionality and 
orienting sensitivity, which have been previously theorized but not yet so reliably measured. The 
purposes of the second study were to (a) validate the measure developed in the first investigation 
and (b) demonstrate the applied value of the arousability construct in the context of training. 
Results from the second study (N=45) demonstrated significant main effects, but the interaction 
effects were inconclusive. They neither clearly confirm nor invalidate the hypotheses, but they 
do raise further questions.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
Training is an immense and important industry in modern society. Each year billions of 
dollars are spent on training, and millions of lives are affected by it. Corporate training, for 
example, accounts for about $55.8 billion (O’Leonard, 2007) a year in the U.S. alone, and U.S. 
military training enrolls more than a million new- and continuing-trainees, annually (Department 
of Defense, 2007). In the last 40 years, training has dramatically progressed and expanded, due 
to cultural, technological, economic, and political influences, as well as new philosophies 
regarding the importance of human capital (e.g., Salas & Cannon-Bowers, 2001). As society 
continues to progress in this fashion—becoming ever more technologically complex and 
culturally diverse—training will likely continue to play a significant role in most private, public, 
and governmental institutions. 
Despite its importance, many training endeavors fail, while others are only partially 
successful. For instance, Banfield and his colleagues (Banfield, Jennings, & Beaver, 1996) 
describe two common corporate-training failure scenarios. The first is that staff with the lowest 
skills—and therefore greatest need to receive training—are able to avoid training or otherwise 
restrict their participation in it, so that the training rarely affects the way they actually carry out 
their jobs. Second, among the rest of the corporate population, motivation to impact 
organizational performance remains low, and the few individuals who become enthusiastic about 
corporate training (and corporate enhancement) remain isolated and fail to gain ‘critical mass.’  
As Banfield et al.’s examples imply, many different factors contribute to the success (or 
failure) of training, and many relevant issues fall outside the scope of the training itself. These 
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outside factors include individual differences among the trainees, such as cognitive ability, locus 
of control, self-efficacy, organizational commitment, expectations, pre-training motivation, and 
so on (see Cannon-Bowers et al., 1995). Although, these influences cannot be changed or 
controlled by the trainer; they can be diagnosed and (potentially) compensated for. This, in turn, 
may lead to greater training success.  
With the diversity of available training approaches and the accessibility of computers, it 
is plausible that individualized training could be effectively delivered via computer-based 
training programs. However, considering individual differences for training purposes has met 
with some resistance. 
Practically, individual differences can be difficult and expensive to design for. Numerous 
cognitive styles, personality variants, and learning styles have been identified, and the interplay 
of these variables adds further complexity (e.g., Jonassen, 1993). Even when a manageable 
quantity of individual variables are examined, it is often not practical to redesign training to 
accommodate variables that include many different categories, variables that only affect a small 
portion of the population, or variables that are difficult to measure. Most individual differences 
fall into these categories, and consequently, they have not received much consideration in 
teaching or applied design. 
Ideal individual characteristics to consider would have only a few categorical levels, 
affect a considerable portion of the population, be easily and reliably measured, and 
meaningfully influence training outcomes. Further, individualized training solutions should be 
practical to create and quick/easy to distribute to different learner groups.  
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Purpose of the Current Studies 
This dissertation will review one variable (i.e., trait arousability) that may satisfy these 
criteria. After trait arousability and its potential to influence computer-based training are 
reviewed, two studies will then be conducted to explore the viability of using the variable for 
differentiated computer-based training. If trait arousability proves to be a useful individual 
difference to consider, then general guidelines of how to apply it will be drafted. 
Arousability describes an individual’s emotional and physiological reactivity to novel 
events (Mehrabian & Ross, 1977; Mehrabian, 1994). While every person experiences a range of 
high- and low-arousal states, research suggests that stable individual differences in trait 
arousability exist. In other words, some individuals are believed to be particularly sensitive to 
stimuli, and consequently, they are likely to experience high-arousal states more often and for 
longer durations. Categorically, it appears that most of the population (about 75-80%) is 
comprised of less-sensitive individuals. While about 20-25% of the population is made-up of 
highly-sensitive people who are easily over-stimulated and consequently perform more poorly in 
certain situations (e.g., achievement-based or distraction-filled environments; see Yermolayeva–
Tomina, 1964; Mehrabian & Ross, 1979).  
Trait arousability is typically measured using a Likert-style survey. Several different 
surveys exist, including Mehrabian’s (1994) Trait Arousability Scale, Aron and Aron’s (1997) 
Highly Sensitive Person scale, Coren’s (1988) Arousal Predisposition Scale, and Satow’s (1987) 
Environmental Sensory Stimuli scale. Each of the surveys require only a few minutes to 
complete, and they are easily scored. However, there is no de facto trait arousability 
measurement apparatus. Thus, the first part of the experimental research is dedicated to 
comparing results from the various scales, and if appropriate, combining items from different 
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scales to create a single, more robust device. If appropriate, factor analytical methods will be 
used to divide the items into theoretically solid sub-constructs.  
Once a unified measure has been compiled, it will be used to classify participants in a 
subsequent study that explores the impact of arousability on training. In this study, training 
material will be presented in either a high-stimulation or low-stimulation format. Participants 
will receive the training, and then its effectiveness will be judged. Outcome measures of 
performance will certainly be used, and measures of workload, anxiety, distraction, and concept-
map formation may also be employed (depending upon the results of the pilot studies).  
Finally, if (as hypothesized) arousability exerts a meaningful influence on training, then 
guidelines for practically applying mitigation strategies for it will be created. Specifically, the 
guidelines will answer questions such as: (a) What are the ideal levels of stimulation for high- or 
low-arousability groups? (b) How can the ‘stimulation level’ of a training system be reliably 
calculated? (c) And what degree of performance improvement might be expected, if arousability 
is accounted for? (Mehrabian and his colleagues have already developed an approach to 
numerically categorize stimuli. Their work would be used to inform these specific, applied 
questions.) 
If arousability proves to be a significant, meaningful individual difference then exploring 
it could be important in a number of ways. First, this work could show that individualized 
training, in general, is both possible and practical. Second, arousability could be found to 
meaningfully affect training performance, and thus compensating for it might improve training 
effectiveness. And finally, this work could help inform the future of computer-based training, 
where systems will likely will exploit dynamic, adaptive solutions and respond to their individual 
users in ways we are only starting to explore. 
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CHAPTER TWO: EDUCATION AND TRAINING REVIEW 
Individual Differences and Adaptive Training 
Today, most training is still carried out in a traditional manner, where some number of 
learners are exposed, often as a group, to the same training regime. Along these lines, training 
facilities may create guidelines for trainers’ behavior and curriculum activities, with the goal of 
establishing equal treatment and uniform measures for all learners. From one perspective, the 
attempt to deemphasize learners’ differences makes training more egalitarian. However, from 
another, pretending learners are a homogonous group is unrealistic and may be detrimental to 
individuals’ performance.  
For instance, about 25% of military pilot-trainees fail the training program, despite 
having passed a rigorous select process, and presumably, having the capacity to succeed; each 
failure costs the US Air Force between $50,000 to $80,000 (Hunter & Burke, 1989). Failures, 
such as this, may be prevented if the training were more effective for those 25% of learners—if it 
adapted to their individual needs. Nonetheless, making effective use of adaptive training remains 
difficult and controversial (e.g., Crozier, 2002); the science associated with adaptive training is 
sometimes faddish, and empirical results are often mixed. However, by exploring individual 
characteristics rooted in core cognitive processes (such as arousal), adapting training may 
become more realistic and effective.  
In this section, a review of individual differences and adaptive training is presented, and 
popular trends in adaptive instruction, including learning styles and differentiated training, are 
discussed and critiqued. At the end of the section, approaches to adaptive training rooted in 
cognitive theory are presented.  
6 
A Brief Overview of Individual Differences 
The phrase ‘individual differences’ describes the diverse psychological characteristics 
exhibited by distinct persons, including differing personalities, motivations, intelligence levels, 
abilities, interests, values, and self-concepts. Definitively, individual differences are the objective 
and quantitative variations of individuals’ behaviors (Anastasi, 1958). These variations may stem 
from heritable or environmental factors, or be the results of experiential calibration of evolved 
mechanisms (i.e., genetic inputs being filtered through environmental encounters; called the 
behavior-genetic hypothesis) (Buss & Greiling, 1999).  
Many individual characteristics display stability in longitudinal studies. For example, 
individuals’ mean intelligence scores remain stable (relative to normal age-related decline) for 
intervals of 45 years or more, and individual differences in personality traits display uniformly-
high consistency after childhood (Stokes-Hendriks, 2002). These and similar findings suggest, 
first, that many individual differences stem from genetic predispositions and, second, that most 
meaningful environment influences occur early in life, and thus, the behavioral outcomes are 
‘set’ early on (Alwin, 1994). (Although this is a simplified view, it is a fair conceptualization of 
most individual traits; for a more robust explanation see Buss & Greiling, 1999.)  
For the purposes of training, the etiology of individual differences is not necessarily 
important; however, the stability of individual traits is key. Because many individual differences 
show temporal stability, they can serve as valid predictors for future performance. Hence, 
individual traits can be—and have been—used for a variety of purposes, though most often for 
selection and categorization. 
Although recognition of individual differences dates back to Plato’s time (Anastasi, 
1958), Sir Francis Galton’s work in the late 1800’s formed the foundation of differential 
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psychology. Galton was motivated by the work of Charles Darwin and strove to explore 
Darwin’s theories amongst the human population. Initially, Galton examined intellectual and 
ability traits, looking for genetic causes for eminence in society (Galton, 1869; Buss & Poley, 
1979).  
Before Galton, scientists typically viewed individual variations as statistical ‘noise.’ 
Thus, Galton not only brought fresh theories and new statistical methods to psychology, but he 
also impelled differential psychology in to being. The science of individual differences grew 
steadily after Galton’s contributions but was notably propelled by World War I. In 1917, 
American Psychological Association (APA) President Robert M. Yerkes called on psychologists 
to help the war effort, and they responded by developing measures of individual differences for 
the military. More than 1.7 million American soldiers were evaluated for selection and 
classification purposes by the Army Alpha and Beta intelligence tests (Furnham, 1992; Anastasi, 
1958), and shortly after the tests’ development, the first standardized personality inventory was 
created: The Woodworth Test of Emotional Stability (Furnham, 1992). These military studies 
marked a significant milestone for individual measurement—and for psychology as a whole. 
After the studies, the APA grew 14-times over, and psychology began to be accepted as a 
legitimate science, worldwide (Marks, 1976-77)  
Today, individual differences such as intelligence and personality are still recognized as 
important indicators of job fit and performance, and they continue to be used for military and 
industrial selection (Stokes-Hendriks, 2002). However, differential psychology is marred by its 
early discriminatory misuses. During the field’s early years, racism and sexism were widely-held 
beliefs, and the techniques offered by individual differences testing were well-suited for 
‘scientifically’ demonstrating the superiority of one race/sex over the others. As Lieberman says 
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of the time: “Although slavery was in the past, Jim Crow segregation provided a context in 
which the exploited status of ‘Negroes’ still needed justification” (2001:71).  
Biased measures of individual differences—often of intelligence—were used to justify 
African-American’s social challenges, segregation, or slavery (see Herrnstein and Murray, 1994; 
Gould, 1996; Brace, 1997:865). Even today, prominent scientists, most notably J. Philippe 
Rushton, continue to generate controversy by exploring connections (arguably, biased or 
unbiased) between individual characteristics and race or gender (Lieberman, 2001; see Rushton, 
1995). Hence, although the field of differential psychology has steadily advanced, and has been 
successfully applied to numerous areas, including learning (e.g., Gilliland & Clark, 1939), 
individual measurement remains somewhat controversial.  
Learning Styles 
Beginning in earnest around 40 years ago, educationalists attempted to bypass some of 
the controversy by identifying individual differences that were not necessarily connected to 
performance (e.g., Crozier, 2002; Messick, 1984). By doing this, they hoped to remove the 
stigma that certain individual characteristics (e.g., I.Q.), and therefore certain individuals (e.g., 
Caucasian children), were superior to others. These educationalists theorized that each person 
has their own approach to learning, or a learning style, and that all approaches have the potential 
to achieve the same levels of performance. 
One of the departures, compared to other forms of individual difference measures at the 
time, was that learning styles were not used for selection or categorization. Rather, they were 
used to inform instructors, so that learning could be adapted to the learner. Hence they were used 
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to adapt the system rather than select for it. Today, learning styles remain one of the 
predominantly studied form of adaptive instruction.  
Although learning styles are often-studied and quite popular among some practitioners, 
they nonetheless garner extreme criticism. First, the learning styles literature is highly 
fragmented. For example, competing terms are often used interchangeably, including ‘learning 
styles,’ ‘learning strategies’, ‘approaches to learning’, ‘cognitive styles’, ‘conative styles’, 
‘cognitive structures’, ‘thinking styles’, ‘teaching styles’, ‘motivational styles’, ‘learning 
orientations’, and ‘learning conditions’ (Coffield et al., 2004). The inconsistent vocabulary is 
presented here as an indicator of the field’s disunity. Many other examples can be found, 
including the investigators’ disagreement about the stability of learning styles, the variety of 
research approaches to studying learning styles, and disagreement about how to use this 
knowledge for pedagogical purposes (Coffield et al., 2004; Curry, 1990). Further, there are 
nearly 100 competing models of learning styles. Nearly all of the models are comprised of 
dichotomous descriptions of learners such as field-dependent vs. field-independent learners, 
common-sense vs. dynamic learners, or random vs. sequential learners. In their extensive review 
of learning styles, Coffield and his colleagues (2004) conclude:  
The sheer number of dichotomies betokens a serious failure of accumulated 
theoretical coherence and an absence of well-grounded findings, tested through 
replication. Or to put the point differently: there is some overlap among the 
concepts used, but no direct or easy comparability between approaches; there is 
no agreed ‘core’ technical vocabulary. The outcome – the constant generation of 
new approaches, each with its own language – is both bewildering and off-putting 
to practitioners and to other academics who do not specialise in this field. 
(p. 136).  
 
Yet, despite these “significant difficulties in the bewildering confusion of definitions,” 
learning styles research has zealously continued (Curry, 1987, p. 3). Which leads to the second 
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problem: Much of the research lacks rigor (e.g., Messick 1984; Coffield et al., 2004). In Coffield 
et al.’s review, many critical examples of this are offered. For instance almost all of the 
influential models of learning styles suffer from psychometric weaknesses; only three (out of the 
approximately 100 total models) “could be said to even come close” to meeting minimum 
psychometric standards (p. 139).  
Further, unsubstantiated (and occasionally outlandish) claims are sometimes made. For 
example, Gregorc bases his Mind Styles™ model on his own ‘metaphysical’ experiences, and 
despite lacking theoretical bases and receiving unsupportive empirical evaluations (see Coffield 
et al., 2004; Joniak & Isaksen, 1988; and O’Brien, 1990), he continues to make strong statements 
about his model’s veracity and usefulness (Gregorc, 2008). In another example, Dunn makes the 
extravagant claim that endemic low achievement and poor motivation are created by ignoring 
students’ learning preferences (see Dunn, 2003), and that “the research shows that every single 
time you use learning styles, children learn better, they achieve better, they like school better” (as 
quoted by O’Neil, 1990, p. 7). Meanwhile, Fielding argues learning styles “should be a student 
entitlement and an institutional necessity” (1994, p. 393). Overall, Coffield et al. (2004) describe 
this trend by saying, for some “the absence of sound evidence provides no barrier to basing their 
arguments on either anecdotal evidence or ‘implicit’ suggestions in the research” (p. 118). 
Yet, despite its shaky foundations, the notion of learning styles has become popularly 
commercialized by consultants and the media. This leads to a third problem: That is, 
commercialization has caused the science behind learning styles to become further diluted (for 
mass consumption), meanwhile popularizing the construct to a segment of eager practitioners 
who seem to have accepted it as dogmatic truth. “In many ways, the use of different inventories 
of learning styles has acquired an unexamined life of its own, where the notion of learning styles 
11 
itself and the various means to measure it are accepted without question” (Coffield et al., 2004, 
p. 8), and that for learning styles enthusiasts “…learning styles are the central doctrine in a quasi-
evangelical crusade to transform all levels of education” (p. 125). 
With these complications, it is not surprising that the use of learning styles is rejected by 
many academics and practitioners (albeit, not the dogmatic ones mentioned above). Furthermore, 
in addition to the confusing science, questionable measures, and negative impact of 
commercialism, opponents of learning styles question their real influence on the process of 
learning. In their extensive review, Coffield et al. (2004) were only able to find one study that 
explored the percentage of variance attributed to learning styles: Furnham, Jackson, and Miller 
(1999) looked at the variance explained by personality and learning styles, together, and found 
that it only accounted for about 8% of the total effect on learning performance of telephone sales 
staff.  
In summary, learning styles represent one of the most popular channels for the study and 
application of individual difference research for education and training. However, despite its 
popularity, this research suffers from (a) a disjointed scientific core, (b) poor psychometric 
support, (c) over-commercialization, and (d) an apparently modest impact on actual learning 
outcomes. Further, its greatest problem might be laid at the feet of overzealous researchers and 
dogmatic practitioners, whose dogged (over-)support for the learning styles has turned many 
other scientists and practitioners firmly against this research.  
Differentiated Instruction 
Differentiated instruction is another commercialized approach for utilizing individual 
differences in education and training. It is more philosophy than theory, and it typically includes 
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and extends the application of learning styles. The vision of differentiated instruction is a 
learning environment where the learners are each engaging in their own, preferred learning 
experiences while still attaining the same knowledge and skills. More specifically, the goal of 
differentiated instruction is to deliver various levels of instructor support, task complexity, 
pacing, and learning methods to different learners, many of whom may have differing ability 
levels (Tomlinson, 2000).  
In differentiated classrooms, teachers are leaders who establish learning goals for 
their learners. Always, however, because they understand their students’ 
individuality and trust their insights, they invite learners to participate in shaping 
classroom procedures, making choices that work best for them and thinking of 
ways to make the classroom more effective (Tomlinson, 2000:27).  
 
Differentiated instruction receives similar criticisms as learning styles approaches. First, 
the field lacks a suitable operationalized definition. For instance, Adams & Pierce (2006) offer 
this explanation: “Instruction may be differentiated in content, process, or product according to 
the students’ readiness, interest, or learning profiled” (p. 2). Other proponents offer similarly 
vague definitions (see for example, Hall, 2002; Tomlinson, 2004; Tomlinson, 2001; Tomlinson 
& Kalbfleisch, 1998) 
Second, there are very few major studies on the effectiveness of differentiated instruction 
(Burns, 2005; see also Subban, 2006 for a review). Most empirical studies in this area focus on 
instructor/learner motivation, instructors’ self-efficacy for using differentiated techniques, or 
instructors’ subjective beliefs about differentiated instruction’s effectiveness (Subban, 2006). 
However, a few empirical investigations on performance have been conducted. For instance, 
McAdamis (2001) found low-scoring students made statistically-significant improvement after 
they received differentiated instruction. However, the McAdamis study also included an entire-
school change in philosophy, which included professional development, mentoring, intensive 
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planning sessions, teacher support groups, and so on. Consequently, it is difficult to determine 
what, in particular, affected students’ scores. In a different large-scale deployment of the 
concept, Burns (2005) found that differentiated instruction had no positive influence on middle 
or high school students’ academic achievement or standardized test scores; although, middle 
school teachers (subjectively) felt that the differentiated instruction aided their students’ 
understanding.   
Third, putting differentiated instruction into practice is impractical. It requires that 
instructors have the time and ability to diagnose individual students’ needs and then create 
uniquely-tailored learning processes for each. As Moll (2003) explains, “No two students in any 
classroom learn the same way. The teacher must vary, in a purposeful way, the methods, 
materials, procedures, and environment of learning to reach every student in the classroom.” 
Although, as other proponents explain, differentiated instruction does not necessarily mean 
individualized instruction—because similar students can be grouped (e.g., Tomlinson, 1999)—it 
nonetheless seems difficult to effectively implement and does prove time consuming (e.g., Ernst 
& Ernst, 2005). While some instructors may excel at diagnosing learners and developing unique 
curricula for them, others will likely lack the skills or motivation to do so. Furthermore, in any 
large-scale training operation (such as a multinational business or for the military), consistency 
across instructors would be difficult to ensure. As Burns (2005) discovered in practice: (a) 
implementing differentiated instruction on a large scale affects completion of the standard 
curriculum, (b) different instructors will implement the differentiated instruction model to 
varying degrees, and (c) instructors’ beliefs about differentiated instruction significantly affect 
their willingness to use it. 
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In summary, differentiated instruction offers an utopist paradigm in which curriculum 
and the classroom environment are uniquely tailored to each individual’s needs. While the ideals 
of differentiated instruction are respectable; fully achieving this paradigm in reality is 
impractical. As a philosophy, differentiated instruction seems to encourage instructors to think 
about their individual students needs—which is good! However, trying to formalize 
differentiated instruction into a procedural learning strategy is untenable, and the empirical data 
suggest that in the end, differentiated instruction hardly affects how much individuals learn. 
Adaptive-Intelligent Tutoring Systems 
The adaptive learning approaches discussed so far can be considered human-human, or 
learner-instructor, focused paradigms (e.g., Moore, 1989). In the 1950’s, Pask and McKinnon-
Wood introduced the first adaptive instruction machine, therefore inventing a new learner-
machine (or learner-interface) interaction (e.g., Hillman, Willis & Gunawardena, 1994). Pask 
and McKinnon-Wood’s Self Adaptive Keyboard Instructor (SAKI; Pask, 1960; 1982) modified 
typing exercises based upon the learners’ performance. Using SAKI, training times were 
typically shortened by one-half to two-thirds, compared to conventional instruction methods of 
the time. 
Since SAKI’s time, intelligent tutoring systems have continued to evolve. Today, there 
are two broad categories of systems:  
Speaking about adaptive systems we stress that these systems attempt to be 
different for different students and groups of students by taking into account 
information accumulated in the individual or group student models. Speaking 
about intelligent systems we stress that these systems apply techniques from the 
field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) to provide broader and better support for the 
users… (Brusilovsky & Peylo, 2003: 156-157).  
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While many intelligent tutoring systems are both adaptive and intelligent, some systems fall into 
only one category.  
Purely intelligent (i.e., non-adaptive) systems will always provide the same diagnosis in 
response to the same stimuli, regardless of a learner’s previous actions. For example, intelligent 
language tutoring systems (such as German Tutor by Heift & Nicholson, 2001) are typically only 
intelligent. They perform complex analyses on learners’ immediate performance in order to 
optimize the education material and approach. However, these systems rarely include any student 
modeling component; thus, the systems do not incorporate dynamic models of learners (e.g., 
Heift & Schulze, 2003).  
In contrast, purely adaptive (i.e., non-intelligent) systems will select different diagnoses 
based upon learners’ past actions; these systems can be effective using simple state-machine 
models and do not necessarily require artificial intelligence. For instance, computer-based 
adaptive tests select test items, in real time, according to the examinee’s ability level. These 
adaptive (non-intelligent) systems are quite common and are similar to widespread testing 
systems such as the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT), Test of English as a 
Foreign Language (TOEFL), Graduate Records Examination (GRE), Armed Sciences Vocational 
Aptitude Battery (ASVAB), and Microsoft Certified Professional exams (Lilley & Barker, 2004). 
While these adaptive systems are effective, they are certainly not ‘intelligent.’ 
Today, nearly all intelligent, adaptive, or adaptive-and-intelligent tutoring systems are 
performance-focused; that is, they analyze learners’ performance and then execute performance-
focused mitigations (e.g., ‘coaching students or diagnosing their misconceptions’ Brusilovsky & 
Peylo, 2003: 156). Only very recently have a few investigators begun to examine learners’ 
processes that are not observable. These researchers are developing ways to analyze, interpret, 
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and then somehow manipulate learners internal socio-psychological states (e.g., mood or 
motivation-level). For instance in 2004, Chaffar and Frasson proposed the ESTEL architecture, 
most likely the first published architecture for intelligent tutoring systems that offered a clear 
strategy for assessing learners’ states and inducing ‘optimal emotional states’ for learning. 
Around the same time, the Tutoring Research Group (TRG) at the University of Memphis 
developed AutoTutor, an intelligent tutoring system that can respond to learners’ emotions by 
using inputs such as a video of the learner’s face or a posture detector (D’Mello et al., 2005). 
Other investigators are also beginning to contribute to this new approach (see Porayska-Pomsta 
et al., 2008); however, the science of affective-adaptive-intelligent tutoring systems is still in its 
infancy. 
Adaptive-intelligent tutoring systems can be very effective. For instance, learners who 
use AutoTutor (discussed above) show test-score improvements of 0.4 to 1.0 standard deviations, 
which is the average improvement achieved when learners use effective systems (Graesser et al., 
2002). Consequently, these systems certainly will continue to play a role in the future of 
education and training. As Sarrafzadeh et al. (2003) succinctly explain: 
[Adaptive-intelligent tutoring systems] offer many advantages over the traditional 
classroom scenario: they are always available, non-judgmental and provide 
tailored feedback. They have proved to be effective, resulting in increased 
learning (p. 501). 
 
However, adaptive-intelligent tutoring systems are still only half as effective as human 
tutors (e.g., Porayska-Pomsta et al., 2008). Proponents of the affective-adaptive-intelligent 
paradigm explain the discrepancy by pointing out tutoring systems’ inability to attend to non-
performance cues. They suggest that system designers study effective human tutors’ abilities to 
support learning, and analyze the non-performance cues and socio-psychological inferences that 
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the human tutors make (Porayska-Pomsta et al., 2008). They also recommend using alternative 
input devices, such as physiological sensors (e.g., EEGs, eye-tracking), in order to access more 
meaningful non-performance data.  
A second problem of adaptive-intelligent tutoring systems is that they rarely account—a 
priori—for learners’ individual differences. Instead, these differences are discovered and 
mapped only after repeated interactions with the system.  
In conclusion, adaptive-intelligent tutoring systems are effective learning tools. Despite 
their high degree of success, they can still be improved upon: Specifically by incorporating 
additional cognitive theories to expand their focus beyond performance measures and 
interventions, incorporating psycho-physiological measures that can help identify cognitive 
states, and integrating meaningful data from individual differences research to help establish 
baseline parameters and interpret non-performance data.  
Summary 
In conclusion, as this brief review indicates, adaptive training approaches range from the 
highly-successful to the highly-unsupported. The least successful approaches (e.g., learning 
styles) fail due to their shaky scientific bases or impracticality to implement (e.g., differentiated 
instruction). The most successful approaches (e.g., adaptive-intelligent tutors) rely primarily 
upon strict performance measures to diagnose and respond to learners, and therefore, despite 
their effectiveness they are still somewhat limited.  
Practically-speaking, the next generation of adaptive learning systems will likely be 
computer-based. They will respond to learners’ performance, as well as other cues (either 
observable or psycho-physiological data) that indicate learners’ socio-psychological states. These 
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systems will also utilize models regarding individual differences, which will help establish 
system baselines for individual learners and enable the system to better interpret learners’ actions 
or cognitive-state data. In the next subsection, a case will be made for using cognitive 
psychological and individual differences research to improve upon contemporary adaptive 
instruction approaches. 
Individual Differences and Adaptive Training: A Cognitive Approach 
“There is an intertwined and reciprocal relation between cognitive theory and educational 
practice—a relation that benefits both fields” (Mayer, 2002: 55). As Mayer’s quotation 
exemplifies, the study of cognitive psychology can provide a significant benefit to the practice of 
education, and conversely, the practical educational problems educators face can inform 
cognitive theorists and guide their research. Cognitive psychology can bring theory structure, 
operational hypotheses, and a framework for experimental analysis to education. The adaptive 
instruction approaches discussed in the previous subsections each can be improved upon, via the 
application of cognitive psychology.  
Education and training that incorporates the study of individual differences can 
particularly benefit from the decades of analyses into differential psychology. Potentially, the 
most meaningful individual variables can be discovered by examining individual differences that 
are predicted based-upon models of cognition. In this way, the study of adaptive training 
progresses from theory, to analysis, to application—rather than the converse. This traditional 
approach to theoretical analyses also ensures the greatest likelihood of success.  
So, if practitioners are serious about effective individualize training what can they do? 
The answer is to first turn to science, and identify individual variables that have predicted, 
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meaningful influences on the desired outcomes (particularly performance). Look for variables 
that are stable and based in core cognitive functions, that affect a large portion of the population, 
and have few dimensional categories. Once these target variables are identified, they must next 
be rigorously tested, and outcome gains must be sufficiently large to warrant the investment of 
time and energy. Finally, when applications using this research are developed, they must be 
practical and deployable. For instance, valid measures and clear recommendations for 
individuals must be available, so that instructors are not left guessing.  
Through reliance upon the scientific approach and cognitive research, rigor and better 
outcome monitoring can be brought to the applications of learning styles/differentiated 
instruction. And, through the application of cognitive science, intelligent-adaptive tutoring 
systems can progress to their next stage of development, looking past basic performance and into 
the minds of the learners.  
 
 
 
Definitions 
Thus far, this report has included literature from the learning and training fields, and 
made little distinction between the terms. For the purposes of this chapter’s broad overview, the 
difference between these fields was not relevant. However, their definitions should now be 
noted. In research and industry, the distinction between ‘learning’ and ‘training’ is up for debate. 
Sweller (2005: 20) suggests that “learning is defined as an alteration in long-term memory.” 
Training can be considered a more discrete, performance-measured component of learning. As 
Vince Eugenio, chief learning officer of Randstad US, explains: 
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Training is a series of very specific, structured activities that are related to the 
achievement of clearly stated performance objectives that are typically related to 
doing a job. (quoted in Whitney, 2006). 
 
Hence training is an intentionally-constructed process designed to transfer specific 
knowledge, skills, and/or attitudes to others. While learning may take place in a training setting, 
it may also occur in more incidental ways or involve knowledge, skills, or attitudes unnecessary 
for attaining specific performance outcomes. 
The term pedagogy is often used in conjunction with learning. It stems from the Greek 
words paid (‘child’) and agogus (‘leading’), and literally refers to the science of teaching 
children (Knowles, 1980). Since this report is interested in adult training, pedagogical theories 
are not specifically applicable; although, the term pedagogy is sometimes applied to adult 
education.  
The term andragogy was coined to distinguish adult education approaches from child-
centric strategies. Andragogy uses the Greek word anēr (“man, not boy,” or adult). It is a contrast 
to pedagogy in that andragogy assumes that the learners 1) are self-directed rather than 
depended, 2) have accumulated a reservoir of experience that can be accessed for learning, 3) 
that their motivation to learn stems, increasingly, from the developmental tasks of their social 
roles, and 4) that their perspective of the learning is one of performance- rather than subject-
centeredness (i.e., a focus on immediate use, rather than postponed usefulness) (Knowles, 
1980:44-45). 
Finally, adaptive instruction is a general term that refers to the use of alternative 
instructional strategies based upon individual differences. As this review has demonstrated, 
adaptive instruction can take many forms: From computer-based adaptive testing to classroom-
based differentiated curricula. The remainder of this report will focus on adaptive instruction (of 
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adults) for training outcomes. More specifically, it will examine the impact of an individual 
difference—arousability—in the context of adaptive multimedia training.  
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CHAPTER THREE: AROUSAL REVIEW 
General Arousal 
Before arousability is explored in the context of adaptive multimedia training, the 
concept of arousal must be introduced. Arousal is the most fundamental mechanism of the 
nervous system, affecting many downstream processes such as alertness, attention, mood, and 
temperament. Because arousal influences so many other mechanisms, there are different ways to 
conceptualize it. For instance, arousal is often considered in the context of basic stimulus-
response behaviors as a reflexive reaction to environmental stimuli: As an individual encounters 
“novel, intense, unusual, complex, or unpredictable stimuli” (Sokolov, 1960, 1963; as quoted by 
Mehrabian, 1977b) his/her cognitive processes are leveraged to attend to, interpret, and 
categorize the incoming information. Thus, as more stimuli are encountered, individuals 
becomes more aroused. Similarly, arousal is often emphasized in the context of the sleep-wake 
cycle where it refers to the state of responsiveness of an organism. Thus, arousal “moves the 
animal toward readiness for action from a state of inactivity ” (Immelman & Beer, 1989). While 
these sorts of definitions are true, they are somewhat limiting. For instance, these examples 
deemphasize the role of internal stimuli, as well as voluntary motor activity and emotional 
responses. Pfaff (2006) offers a broader operational definition:  
“Generalized arousal” is higher in an animal or human being who is: (S) more 
alert to sensory stimuli of all sorts, and (M) more motorically active, and (E) more 
reactive emotionally (p. 5). 
 
Thus, the broad definition of arousal refers to a person’s levels of mental alertness, physical 
activity, and emotionality.  
23 
Heuristically, it is useful to imagine arousal varying on a continuum from under-aroused 
(e.g., deep sleep, boredom, unengaged) to hyper-aroused (e.g., extremely wakeful, stressed, 
strongly emotional) (e.g., Hebb, 1955). However, this unidimensional conceptualization of 
arousal is not universally accepted. 
Unidimensional vs. Multidimensional Arousal 
The unidimensional perspective sees arousal as an undifferentiated, global psycho-
physiological mechanism: a single continuum ranging from low- to high-arousal. This is perhaps 
best described by the well-known Yerkes-Dodson (1908) law, which models unidimensional 
arousal–performance as a curvilinear (inverted-U) relationship (see Figure 1). The Yerkes-
Dodson model describes a person’s optimum stimulation level (Hebb, 1955; Leuba, 1955). The 
optimum level of arousal theory makes three assumptions: (a) individual differences in 
arousability exist, (b) there is an optimum level of arousal (or ‘stimulation’), (c) individuals 
develop strategies to make their actual arousal level match more closely with their optimum 
level. Thus, individuals who are experiencing low levels of arousal seek excitement, while 
individuals who are experiencing overly-high levels of arousal will try to escape or avoid 
stimulation (e.g., Werre, 1987).  
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Figure 1. Graphical representation of the unidimensional relationship between arousal and 
performance, as initially proposed by Yerkes and Dodson (1908). 
 
While the inverted-U relationship and the theory of optimum arousal are useful rules-of-
thumb, most contemporary arousal investigators believe the construct is more complex than 
these perspectives suggest. Since the mid-1980s, researchers have seriously questioned the 
unidimensional model of arousal for a myriad of reasons (Deffenbacher, 1994), including its lack 
of empirical support (e.g., Robbins, 1997; Hockey, Coles & Gaillard, 1986; Näätänen, 1973; 
Neiss, 1988) and inability to account for differentiated patterns of arousal–stress–motivation–
performance (e.g., Hockey et al., 1986; Posner & Rothbart, 1986; Fazey & Hardy, 1988).  
Also, as Thayer (1967) colloquially points out: Individuals may describe themselves as 
generally alert in a certain situation without necessarily experiencing the negative emotionality 
associated with unidimensional high arousal (e.g., jittery, intense, anxious, or fearful feelings). 
Consequently, Thayer suggests a two-factor model of arousal that separates the construct into 
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tense arousal (or preparatory-emergency activation) and energetic arousal (or general 
activation) (Thayer, 1967; 1989).  
Tense arousal includes negative emotionality and occurs in response to danger (real or 
imagined); it manifests emotions such as anxiety, tension, or fear. Energetic arousal represents 
the general alertness that drives vigor and readiness. Tense arousal is associated with avoidance 
behaviors, and it ranges from calm to anxious; while energetic arousal is associated with 
approach behaviors, and it varies from tired to energetic. These two systems interact to create 
four poles of arousal: ‘tense-energy,’ ‘tense-tiredness,’ ‘calm-energy,’ and ‘calm-tiredness’ 
(Thayer, 1989; see also Matthews et al. (1990) for a similar three-factor model).  
Tucker and Williamson (1984) propose a different two-factor model where one neural 
system maintains readiness for action (i.e., activation) and another responds to novel stimuli (i.e., 
arousal). They base their theory on neuroanatomical research showing distinct pathways that 
respond independently to either continued stimulation or repetitive stimuli (see Pribram & 
McGuinness, 1975). 
However, critics complain that some arousal theories—such as those just discussed—
neglect the role of cognitive effort. They believe that arousal can be mitigated to some extent by 
the individual experiencing it (e.g., Kahneman, 1973). Thus, arousal models including neural 
control mechanisms have appeared. 
For instance, Hockey (1986a; Hockey & Hamilton, 1983) extends the two-factor model 
of arousal to include a state control mechanism. He contends that combined responses to stimuli 
produce unique arousal states, and that the affects of these states can be mitigated via conscious 
control. Hockey asserts that a central control system makes cognitive resource-management 
decisions in order to offset the negative affects of suboptimal or supraoptimal arousal. Individual 
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differences in this resource management mechanism equate to different degrees of success when 
coping with nonoptimal arousal. Hockey’s control state model makes several assumptions. First, 
he assumes that behavior is goal directed, and that the control of goal states is a self-regulating 
process. Second, he assumes that there is a comparison mechanism that discerns differences 
between optimal and nonoptimal arousal. Third, he assumes that the central control system can 
respond to mismatches in desired/actual arousal and leverage resources (if it so chooses) to 
overcome the mismatched state (e.g., Beauducel, Brocke & Leue, 2006). 
Yet, critics continue to raise concerns. Notably, Hardy and Fazey (Hardy, 1996; Hardy & 
Fazey, 1987; Fazey & Hardy 1988; Hardy & Parfitt 1991) question the curvilinear relationship 
between (unitary or multidimensional) arousal and performance. They suggest that under low 
cognitive anxiety the inverted-U may hold true, but when a person experiences high anxiety and 
supraoptimal arousal then the degradation in performance is often sudden and dramatic (i.e., a 
catastrophe). Furthermore, once someone has ‘fallen off the cliff,’ small reductions in arousal are 
no longer able to improve performance. Figure 2 depicts the relationship between arousal and 
performance as per the catastrophe model. 
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Figure 2. Hardy & Parfitt’s (1991) catastrophe model. Reproduced with permission from the 
British Psychology, © The British Psychological Society.   
 
At this point, it may appear that multidimensional arousal theories have definitively 
trumped unidimensional perspectives. However, the case is not yet closed. Certainly, most 
contemporary investigators gravitate toward multidimensional paradigms, but Muse, Harris, & 
Feild (2003) suggest that these investigators are biased against unitary theories. In a review of 
the literature, they conclude that unitary arousal has not received a “fair test”: 
First, it was already clear that there was little representation among the body of 
research of results that supported the inverted-U. If, in fact, the bulk of studies 
were designed in such a way to be biased against a true test of the inverted-U, 
meta-analysis based on those designs and results would tell us little about the 
“true” relation between stress and performance. Because the inverted-U 
encompasses the negative linear model (the negative linear is the right side of the 
U), support for the negative linear model does not necessarily imply lack of 
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support for the inverted-U if the positive linear side of the U is not addressed in 
the study. Second and similarly, the bulk of the studies report correlational, linear-
based results. Such results do not allow us to look for nonlinear effects as 
suggested by the inverted-U; access to the original data would be required (p. 
352).  
 
Finally, Pfaff (2006) offers a middle ground, calling the distinction between the two 
paradigms a “false dichotomy” (p. 7). He suggests that arousal is ultimately comprised of 
generalized arousal and specific forms (e.g., hunger, sex, fear). As evidence of this, Pfaff 
references his own empirical work, showing that generalized arousal contributes from 29.7% to 
45% to overall arousal functions across different experimental situations. He also cites a number 
of other studies (e.g., Campbell & Sheffield, 1953; Barfield & Sachs, 1968; Antelman & 
Szechtman, 1975; Brown, 1953; and Richter, 1922) showing how one form of arousal (e.g., 
hunger) can influence another (e.g., emotion), and he offers compelling neuroanatomical 
evidence in support of his theory (see Pfaff, 2006, for supporting explanations and numerous 
references). 
Pfaff does not reject the various dimensions of multidimensional arousal outright; 
instead, he contends that “teamwork, not identity, among autonomic responses fosters 
information flow and cooperation” (p. 71). In other words, he believes that the many components 
of arousal work in concert to produce the arousal state. Although the various aspects of 
generalized arousal are not correlated, Pfaff explains, they are nonetheless coordinated: 
What we have, therefore, are autonomic functions that are physiologically 
coordinated to “do the job,” but that are not correlated with each other at time t. 
By analogy, consider a football team. Even though the players are following 
agreed-upon plays and are moving effectively with respect to each other, attempts 
at correlating their responses statistically at any given time would yield no 
correlations. Their movements are cooperative, but not identical (p. 79).  
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Unidimensional vs. Multidimensional Arousal: Summary 
Looking across the many arousal theories, a few generalizations can be rather safely 
assumed. From the multidimensional perspectives, three conclusions can be drawn. First, general 
arousal is likely moderated by other cognitive factors, notably anxiety (or a valenced assessment 
of the arousal source). Whether investigators (such as Thayer) choose to include anxious 
activation as part of the arousal construct or (like Hardy and Fazey) they choose to see it as a 
separate force, it is clear that an individual’s assessment of stimuli (e.g., reward/punishment) can 
produce different behavioral outcomes (e.g., glee/sorrow). Second, coping mechanisms probably 
mitigate degradation in performance due to sub- or supraoptimal arousal. These coping 
mechanisms may be learned strategies (e.g., Kohn, 1996) or (as Hockey suggests) they may be 
neurological mechanisms. Either way, individuals likely possess some way to mitigate arousal-
based performance loss—at least to some extent. And third, the arousal–performance curve is 
most likely not a simple inverted-U in all situations. When other moderators are considered (i.e., 
anxiety) the relationship among the factors must consequently become more complex.  
Muse et al. (2003) remind investigators not to prematurely reject the unitary hypothesis. 
Further, empirical studies and theoretical positions (e.g., Anderson 1994; Eysenck, 1967; 
Humphreys & Revelle, 1984) continue to show the usefulness of the unitary arousal 
hypotheses—at least as a functional heuristic, if not absolute truth. 
Finally, Pfaff (2006) dedicates an entire book to explaining a unique approach to the 
unidimensional/multidimensional arousal debate. His theories help unify the findings from both 
perspectives, and he restores the legitimacy of generalized arousal as part of the overall arousal 
phenomenon—this time as a genuine mechanism, rather than just a heuristic.  
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Arousal and Information Theory 
Understanding arousal depends, in large part, upon understanding the basic premise of 
information theory, a scientific perspective credited to Claude Shannon (see Shannon, 1948). 
One of the fundamental theories within this science is information entropy, which states that 
more information is conveyed when more uncertainty is present. (Shannon uses the term entropy 
to denote uncertainty.) Pfaff (2006) offers a commonsense explanation: 
If any event is perfectly regular, say the ticking of a metronome, the next event 
(the next tick) does not tell us anything new. It has an extremely high probability 
(p) of occurrence in exactly that time bin. Likewise, in the time bins between 
ticks, silence has an extremely high probability of occurring. We have no 
uncertainty about whether, in any given time bin, the tick will occur. According to 
Shannon’s equation, the information in an event is in inverse proportion to its 
probability. Put another way, the more uncertain we are about the occurrence of 
that event, the more information is transmitted, inherently, when it does happen 
(p. 13).  
 
The crux of information entropy is that information rates are highest when uncertainty is 
greatest. Conversely, information rates are lowest when uncertainty is minimized. The important 
distinction, here, is that information delivery—and not quantity—determines the information 
rate. From this, two important observations follow. First, the greater the surprise, uncertainty, or 
novelty associated with a stimulus, the greater arousal “spike” (i.e., arousal amplitude) it will 
cause. Second, the amount of information conveyed by a continuous or repeated stimulus 
declines over time; thus, individuals habituate to an repeated/repetitive stimulus because each 
successive moment of it conveys less information (i.e., each moment contains less uncertainty, 
even though the information content remains fixed). 
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Orientating Reflex 
The arousal “spike” caused by the presentation of unexpected stimuli is called the 
orienting reflex. Specifically, the orienting reflex triggers in response to changes in stimulus 
quality and intensity, and it extinguishes as the same stimulus is presented repeatedly 
(Mehrabian, 1995). The time it takes for arousal to gradually return to baseline is called the 
duration of habituation. Mehrabian (1995: 4) presents another way to conceptualize this: 
Information Rate = (Information Content) / (Duration of Exposure)  
Additionally, Mehrabian and Russell (1974) exemplify the instances when orienting reflex is 
greatest; of course, orienting reflex is strongest when greater uncertainty (i.e., entropy) is present 
(see Table 1): 
 
Table 1: Low/High Entropy Situations* 
Lower Information Rate / Weaker Orienting Reflex Higher Information Rate / Stronger Orienting Reflex 
Redundant Varied 
Simple Complex 
Familiar Novel 
Sparse Dense 
Usual Surprising 
Patterned Random 
Static Moving 
* From Mehrabian & Russell (1974) 
 
In summary, the critical contribution from information theory is that arousal is a reaction 
to the information rate of stimuli, and not necessarily their content. Thus, individual differences 
in arousability (discussed in the following subsection) “only manifest in response to a limited 
class of stimuli, with such differences being attenuated over time because of adaptation. What 
then is the special class of stimuli that is likely to highlight individual differences in patterns of 
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arousal response? These are the novel, intense, unusual, complex, or unpredictable stimuli which 
elicit higher arousal responses from people in general” (Mehrabian 1977b: 238). 
Individual Differences in Arousability 
Most everyone has comparable baseline arousal levels (i.e., resting arousal levels), and 
everyone experiences wide fluctuations in arousal throughout any given day. Universally, high-
information situations elicit higher levels of arousal, and low-information situations elicit lower 
levels (see Mehrabian & Russell, 1974; Duffy, 1962; Humphreys & Revelle, 1984). Within-
subject fluctuations in arousal level describe an individual’s arousal state.  
Psychological states, such as a person’s arousal state, derive from the interaction between 
situational characteristics and an individual’s psychological traits. Psychological traits are stable 
individual characteristics are believed to reflect differences in genetic, biological, 
temperamental, or learned bases for behavior (see Humphreys & Revelle, 1984). Psychological 
traits are nearly impossible for adults to alter (although coping strategies can be learned).  
Trait-based differences in arousability describe individuals’ sensitivity to the intense or 
unexpected stimuli mentioned above. Individuals with high trait arousability are more easily 
aroused and return to their baseline arousal levels (i.e., habituate) more slowly. Highly arousable 
individuals experience both positive and negative stimuli more strongly than other people do 
(Mehrabian, 1994).  
Individual differences in trait arousal have been studied from many different angles and 
under a variety of monikers. This construct has been called general arousability (Gray, 1964), 
introversion/extraversion (e.g., Eysenck, 1967), nervous system strength (e.g., Pavlov, 1955), 
sensitivity (e.g., Aron & Aron, 1997), reactivity (Strelau, 1984), augmenting–reducing (Petrie, 
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1967), stimulus screening (e.g., Mehrabian, 1977b), and trait arousability (e.g., Mehrabian, 
1994). The various names generally reflect differences in approach, scientific focus, or time 
period. However, these constructs are comparable (e.g., Kohn, 1987). For the purposes of this 
report, individual differences in arousal response are labeled ‘arousability.’ In the following 
subsections, each arousability construct is briefly described, in alphabetical order; Table 2 also 
includes a summary of these approaches. 
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Arousability Constructs  
Table 2: Summary of Arousability Constructs (Alphabetical) 
Name Description Selected Sources 
Augmenting–reducing Some individuals neurologically augment 
sensations, while others reduce them. A 
neurophysiological stimulus intensity control 
mechanism causes these differences. 
Petrie, 1967 
Buchsbaum et al., 1986 
General arousability  Individual differences in arousability are 
considered from two factors: sensitivity to 
reward (i.e., impulsivity) and sensitivity to 
punishment (i.e., anxiety). 
Gray, 1964 
Gray, 1987  
Introversion/Extraversion  Introverts and extraverts differ in the 
sensitivity of their arousal system and the 
thresholds of their ARAS. Introverts have 
lower response thresholds and, in general, 
higher cortical arousal. 
Eysenck, 1967 
Nervous system strength  Individuals’ resilience to intense stimulation 
varies along a “strength–weakness” dimension. 
‘Strong’ nervous systems are able to endure a 
greater amount/duration of stimulation than to 
‘weak’ nervous systems. Once a certain 
threshold is crossed, the nervous system shuts 
down (in whole or part); this is called 
‘transmarginal inhibition.’  
Pavlov, 1955 
Rokhin, Pavlov, & Popov, 1963  
Reactivity  Individuals’ reactivity to stimuli varies on a 
continuum from sensitivity to extreme 
endurance under stimulation. Strelau has 
identified six factors in reactivity to stimuli: 
briskness, perseverance, sensory sensitivity, 
emotional reactivity, endurance, and activity.  
Kohn 1985  
Strelau, 1984  
Sensitivity  Arousable individuals possess increased 
nervous-system sensitivity to subtleties, and 
they process stimuli more deeply. 
Aron & Aron, 1997 
Aron, 1996  
Stimulus Screening Screening is an individual difference that 
describes a person’s ability to prioritize, and 
then selectively attend to, distracting stimuli.  
Mehrabian 1977a 
Mehrabian, 1977b 
Trait Arousability Trait arousability describes an individual’s 
emotional and physiological reactivity to novel 
events. It is covarying and complementary to 
stimulus screening ability. 
Mehrabian & Ross, 1977 
Mehrabian, 1994 
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Augmenting–Reducing 
The augmenting-reducing, or stimulus-intensity modulation, perspective suggests that 
individuals vary in their subjective experience of stimulation (Barnes, 1976; Petrie, 1967; Sales, 
1971, 1972). ‘Augmenters’ subjectively amplify stimulus intensity, while ‘reducers’ subjectively 
attenuate it (and ‘moderates’ neither augment nor reduce). However, all people have 
approximately the same optimal-level of (subjective) stimulation. Therefore, augmenters 
typically avoid intense stimuli, while reducers are generally sensation-seekers (Sales 1971, 
1972). [Note, while Zuckerman (e.g., Zuckerman, 1979) contends that the converse is true (i.e., 
augmenters are high, and reducers low, sensation-seekers) this paradox has been clearly 
explained by considering transmarginal inhibition (see Davis, Cowles, & Kohn, 1983).] 
General Arousability 
Gray’s (1964) concept of general arousability describes stable individual differences in 
arousal by examining the dimensions of anxiety and impulsivity. Gray (1987) suggests that three 
systems work in concert to contribute to arousal. First, the behavioral activation system (BAS) 
initiates goal-directed behavior, including approach–avoidance behaviors (e.g., response to 
rewards). Second, the behavioral inhibition system (BIS) responds to threatening or unexpected 
stimuli (e.g., response to punishments). And finally, the nonspecific arousal system (NAS) is 
influenced by both the BAS and BIS, and it ultimately affects the speed and magnitude of a 
person’s responses. The BAS system represents ‘impulsivity,’ while the BIS system represents 
‘anxiety.’  
There is considerable, ongoing debate about Gray’s factors, as well as the relationship 
between sensitivity to reward and sensitivity to punishment, in general (e.g., Franken & Muris, 
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2006). However, what this approach does clearly show is that stimuli’s valence (i.e., whether 
they are regarded positively or negatively) does influence individuals responses to them at the 
physiological level.  
Introversion/Extraversion  
Significant quantities of research have examined the arousability differences between 
extraverts and introverts. Some of the earliest arousal-related investigations carried out 
individually by Gross, McDougall, and Jung sought to explain these basic personality differences 
by way of their arousal responses (Strelau & Eysenck, 1978). However, Eysenck is likely the 
best-known proponent of this approach. He defined introversion/extroversion in terms of 
differences in cortical arousability, suggesting that introverts and extraverts have different 
arousal system sensitivity levels and that introverts’ ARAS (ascending reticulocortical activating 
system) sensory stimulation thresholds are lower. Consequently, introverts have lower response 
thresholds and, in general, higher cortical arousal (Eysenck, 1967).  
However, extraversion does not always show a one-to-one relationship with other models 
of arousability. While some arousability investigators (e.g., Aron, 2004; Gunnar, 1994; Gray, 
1981; Strelau, 1986) have found a high degree of similarity between their measures of 
arousability and extraversion, others (e.g., Mehrabian 1977b; Corulla, 1989; Stelmack et al., 
1985) have found no significant correlations. Most likely, this discrepancy reflects the degree to 
which sociability is considered a component in extraversion (Corr et al., 1995). Eysenck’s 
introversion/extraversion conceptualization comprises impulsiveness and sociability, whereas 
Jung’s approach reflects physical sensitivity and an individual’s preference to reflect upon a 
situation before acting (Aron, 2004; 2006).  
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Eysenck’s (1967) theory does not make a theoretical distinction between the 
power of sociability and impulsivity components of extraversion to influence 
performance. Although these two traits are correlated ( = 0.50), some authors (e.g. 
Carrigan, 1960) have suggested that they represent independent factors, combined 
together by a ‘shot gun wedding’ (Guilford, 1975) of concepts (Corr et al., 
1995: 713). 
 
Aron, who found that about 70% of introverts are also highly arousable (Aron, 2004), 
attempts to explain the relationship between arousability and sociability. She asserts that it is 
partially causal. She argues that since arousability is an inherent trait, evidence of it is manifest 
in infants and children (e.g., Aron, 2002; Liss et al., 2005; Kagan, 1994), and because arousable 
individuals become easily over-stimulated, arousable children may learn to withdraw from 
stimuli. Thus, children who experience over-stimulation may develop strategies for coping with 
it, and these strategies develop into behaviors that are labeled as “shy” (e.g., Aron, Aron, & 
Davies, 2005; Kagan, 1994) or “inhibited” (e.g., Gray, 1981) once the children mature.  
However, Aron notes that arousable children, if raised in an appropriate environment, 
may actually exhibit socially-extraverted behavior as adults (Aron & Aron, 1997). She therefore 
concludes that arousability only partially correlated with measures of low-sociability, a major 
component of many introversion–extroversion scales (Humphreys & Revelle 1984). However, 
the original Jungian conceptualization of introversion still correlates highly with measures of 
arousability. Consequently, when considering arousability from the introversion/extraversion 
perspective, it is important to examine the measurement approaches and critical factors that are 
used to define extraversion.  
Reactivity  
In general, the reactivity paradigm describes an individual’s reactivity to nervous system 
arousal. Strelau defines reactivity as: 
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…a property that determines the intensity (magnitude) of reaction that is 
characteristic for a given individual and is relatively stable. Reactivity constitutes 
a dimension that runs from (sensory or emotional) sensitivity at one pole to 
extreme endurance under strong stimulation at the other (Strelau, 1983: 204).  
 
The definition of reactivity adds little to the other constructs; however, the concept of 
reactivity has been significantly extended by Strelau’s research, who examines arousal and 
arousability’s meaningful affects on temperament and behavior. Strelau’s Regulative Theory of 
Temperament (RTT) model (e.g., Strelau, 1996) describes temperament using six arousal-based 
traits: briskness, perseverance, sensory sensitivity, emotional reactivity, endurance, and activity. 
Briskness describes the tendency to react quickly. Perseverance is the tendency to continue 
reacting after the stimulus has ended. Sensory sensitivity describes an individual’s ability to react 
to low stimulative value sensory stimuli. Emotional reactivity describes the intensity of 
emotional reactions, including emotional sensitivity and emotional endurance. Endurance 
describes reactions to long-lasting or extremely intense stimulation. Finally, activity is the 
tendency to initiate arousal by engaging in behavior that provides stimulation.  
Of special significance in this regulatory process are two temperamental traits—
reactivity and activity. They play a significant role in regulating the stimulative 
value of the surroundings and the person’s own action, in accordance with the 
individual’s need of stimulation. Temperamental traits codetermine the 
individual’s style of action, the choice of situations and behaviors of given 
stimulative value, as well as the psychophysiological costs inherent in performing 
activity under highly stimulating demands (Strelau, 1996: 131).  
 
Consequently, one of most valuable aspects of this approach is its careful factoring of arousal 
responses, and its correlation of arousability, temperament, and behavior.  
Sensitivity  
Aron labels arousability as ‘sensory-processing sensitivity,’ and defines it as increased 
nervous-system sensitivity to subtleties:  
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And this greater sensitivity and its physiological correlates are found at all levels 
of the nervous system, from measures of skin conductance, reaction times, and 
evoked potential (Stelmack, 1990) to subcortical areas (Fischer et al., 1997) to 
differences in cortical processing (generally more right hemisphere activity, e.g. 
Berenbaum & Williams, 1994) (Aron, 2004, p. 338).  
 
 Aron asserts that highly-sensitive people actually process stimuli more deeply (Aron, 
1996). Thus, in addition to a propensity for arousal, highly-sensitive people possess “a talent for 
retrospective and prospective reflection about consequences” (Aron & Aron, 1997, p.349). The 
key differences between Aron’s work and other arousability approaches are that (a) she more 
greatly emphasizes the positive aspects of high arousability, and (b) her work tends to focus on 
developing coping strategies for highly-sensitive (i.e., arousable) adults and children. 
Nervous System Strength and Transmarginal Inhibition 
Russian psychologists carried out some of the earliest arousal research. They developed 
the notion that individuals’ resilience to intense stimulation varied along a “strength–weakness” 
dimension (Pavlov, 1955; Rokhin, Pavlov, & Popov, 1963). Pavlov initiated this theory after 
observing differences in dogs’ reactions to extreme stimulation (i.e., pain). Organisms with 
‘strong’ nervous systems are able to endure a greater amount/duration of stimulation as 
compared to organisms with ‘weak’ nervous systems. However, once a certain threshold is 
crossed, arousal-response and stimulation are no longer correlated. Instead, the organism’s 
nervous system shuts down (e.g., becomes fatigued, loses concentration, loses consciousness, 
etc.), which effectively reduces its arousal. Pavlov labeled this phenomenon ‘transmarginal 
inhibition,’ and it is often abbreviated TMI. 
Highly arousable people experience TMI sooner than less arousable ones who are 
exposed to the same supraoptimal stimulation. This suggests that while highly arousable 
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individuals experience greater arousal at low/medium levels of stimulation, they may actually 
experience lower levels of arousal when very high stimulation occurs (Corr et al., 1995). Hence, 
this research differs from other work on arousability because of its focus on reactions to over-
stimulation. 
Stimulus Screening Ability 
Mehrabian theorizes that individuals who are not highly arousable must screen-out 
irrelevant stimuli before they are physiologically affected by it. He believes that these 
“screeners” apply a hierarchical approach to information processing and focus their attention on 
higher-priority information, which effectively reduces the perceived complexity of their context. 
Conversely, he argues, nonscreeners are less able to ignore intrusive stimuli and consequently 
perceive their environments as more complex and random. This causes nonscreeners to 
experience more intense spikes in arousal (i.e., arousal amplitude) and less rapid declines to their 
baseline levels (i.e., duration of habituation; Mehrabian, 1977b). Thus, stimulus screening theory 
implies that arousability is an individual difference in peoples’ ability to prioritize, and then 
selectively attend to, distracting stimuli.  
Stimulus screening differs from other arousability perspectives because it uses an 
information-processing perspective and suggests that arousable people are less effective 
information parsers. Mehrabian’s approach to arousability effectively operationalizes it; 
however, his tone has been criticized. For instance, Aron suggests that the stimuli that Mehrabian 
labels ‘irreverent’ should be considered ‘subtitles’ and that these may be quite important: 
The only difficulties are, first, the assumption that low screeners can not filter out 
what is irrelevant, which seems to imply that there is some means, probably by 
taking the viewpoint of a high screener, for determining what is relevant. Low 
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screeners may find all the subtle aspects of a situation very relevant (Aron & 
Aron, 1997: 360).  
 
Trait Arousability 
Mehrabian also developed the theory of trait arousability. Trait arousability describes an 
individual’s emotional and physiological reactivity to novel events (Mehrabian & Ross, 1977; 
Mehrabian, 1994). It is covarying and complementary to stimulus screening ability (Mehrabian, 
1995). In other words, where screening ability is the cognitive process, trait arousability is the 
emotional/physiological outcome of that process. Mehrabian uses trait arousability as one of the 
three critical traits that define a person’s personality; it is part of his three factor PAD 
temperament model (e.g., Mehrabian, 1996b), which consists of pleasure-displeasure (P), 
arousal-nonarousal (A), and dominance-submissiveness (D).  
Arousability Constructs: Summary 
Consider lessons-learned from across the spectrum of related arousability theories. The 
augmenting–reducing paradigm suggests that arousal is a subjective reaction to stimuli; hence, 
the same stimuli may elicit different arousal responses from different individuals. Gray’s general 
arousability approach clearly applies a multidimensional definition of arousal to the study of 
arousability, and general arousability suggests that the interpretation of stimuli (e.g., as reward or 
punishment) can affect arousal reactions down to the physiological level. The introversion–
extraversion perspective shows that individual differences in arousability influence core 
personality traits, and that low sociability may be partially caused by high arousability. The 
reactivity perspective, as extended by Strelau, describes six components in arousal responses: 
briskness, perseverance, sensory sensitivity, emotional reactivity, endurance, and activity. The 
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sensitivity approach reminds researchers that hypersensitivity is not necessarily a negative 
phenomenon, and that highly-sensitive people may use their arousability to detect subtleties in 
the environment. The Russian psychologists’ strength–weakness approach to arousability 
contributes the theory of transmarginal inhibition (TMI), which explains why individuals’ 
nervous systems ‘shut down’ when they reaches a certain amount of over-stimulation and that 
highly-arousable individuals have lower thresholds for TMI. Finally, the stimulus-screening and 
trait arousability approaches help operationalize arousability using the information processing 
paradigm. These eight conceptualizations each contribute to the overall understanding of 
individual differences in arousal, and taken together, they effectively define contemporary 
understanding of arousability.  
Effects of Extreme Arousability 
Regardless of the name or nuances of the construct, each of the arousability approaches 
discussed above can be considered to include three broad categories: hypersensitive, 
hyposensitive, and moderate (i.e., ‘normal’). Because hypersensitives are very responsive to 
stimulation, they are likely to experience chronic over-arousal. Conversely, because 
hyposensitives are particularly insensitive, they are likely to be chronically under-aroused. In 
both cases, problems (and sometimes unique benefits) can occur. Below, some commonly 
studied effects are briefly discussed. 
High Arousability and Illness 
Selye’s (1956) concept of general adaptation syndrome states that “more arousable 
persons are more likely to evidence physiological imbalances and illnesses in response to 
environmental stresses” (Mehrabian, 1995: 6). In accordance with this, many arousability 
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researchers’ investigations have found greater incidences of physical, psychosomatic, and 
psychological dysfunctions highly-arousability individuals (Mehrabian, 1995). For instance, 
Moosman (2002) discovered that highly-arousable therapists are more susceptible to vicarious 
traumatization (i.e., trauma induced by experiencing their patients’ trauma by-proxy). Coren 
correlates high arousability and sleeping disorders, particularly insomnia (Coren, 1988). Gray 
(1964) connects high arousability with a greater likelihood of developing PTSD (post-traumatic 
stress disorder), and Aron links childhood stress, high arousability, and adult manifestations of 
anxiety, depression, and shyness. She explains: “When sensitive children are raised under stress 
at home and at school, they are more prone to illness and injury than non-sensitive children; but 
if raised without undue stress, sensitive children are slightly less prone to illness or injury than 
the non-sensitive” (Aron, 2004: 352).  
The medical literature also reports correlations between arousability and physical illness. 
For example, several researchers (e.g., Dembroski et al., 1978; Dorado & Fernández, 1997; 
Furnham, 1984; Lafreniere, 1986) suggest that ‘Type-A’ behavior—a predictor of health 
problems such as heart disease—is connected with excessive arousability, and Lambert-Nehr 
reports a link between susceptibility to migraines and high sensitivity: “It is probable that [their] 
nervous system is overreactive . . . and responds rapidly to any intense bombardment of the brain 
by sensory impulses” (Lambert-Nehr, 2003). 
Some research finds that highly-arousable people are more likely to suffer from 
alcoholism, substance abuse, smoking, obesity, and compulsive gambling. After reviewing the 
literature, Adams (1988) concludes that highly-arousable individuals may attempt to cope with 
their arousability—and the stressful stimulation it causes—by seeking out mitigations, such as 
drugs or alcohol.  
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Finally, in extreme cases, arousability may contribute to mental illnesses like 
schizophrenia, which is characterized by a lack of focus and high distractibility. Several 
empirical investigations have verified a correlation between schizophrenia and arousability (e.g., 
Mehrabian, 1977b; DePalma & Nideffer, 1977). For instance, Dinzeo et. al. (2004) found 
schizophrenics are more highly arousable than controls, and Ludwig and Stark (1973) suggest 
that schizophrenia may be caused by chronic sensory overload, which would be facilitated by 
high arousability.  
Overall, it appears that the general adaptation syndrome theory (i.e., that high arousability 
leads to stress and illness) is supported in a variety of contexts. High arousability appears to 
contribute to numerous health conditions, from stress-related health problems (e.g., a greater risk 
of heart disease reported by Mehrabian, 1995) to instances of extreme mental illness (e.g., 
Dinzeo et. al., 2004). Although anyone who becomes overly stressed can develop these 
conditions, highly arousable people are predisposed to become overly, negatively stimulated; 
hence, their higher incidences of physical and mental maladies.  
High Arousability and Environmental Preference 
Arousability (typically under the stimulus screening paradigm) has been often-studied in 
the environmental-behavior literature—particularly in the area of workplace design. Many 
common workplace variables are moderated by the effects of arousability. For instance, Oldham 
and his colleagues demonstrated that job performance and satisfaction are significantly affected 
by the interaction of individuals’ arousability and the characteristics of the workspace: 
“Employees exhibited the lowest performance and satisfaction when their jobs were low in 
complexity, their screening skills were weak, and they worked in dense areas, areas with few 
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enclosures, or close to other employees” (Oldham, Kulik, & Stepina, 1991, p.929). Oldham 
(1988) has also shown that hypersensitives benefit more greatly than hyposensitives from 
partitioned or low-density office layouts. Fried (2006) contends that the physical features of the 
work environment lead to nonspecific arousal, which in turn can lead to many detrimental 
behaviors, depending upon individuals’ levels of screening ability.  
Similarly, Mehrabian (Mehrabian & Russell, 1975; Mehrabian, 1976) asserts that 
approach-avoidance behaviors to work are moderated by a person’s reactions to and perceptions 
of an environment. Hines and Mehrabian (1979) applied this theory to workplace design and 
demonstrated that individuals’ motivation to work was affected their level of arousal (higher 
arousal limited motivation) and the perceived pleasantness of the environment. Specifically, they 
found that the pleasantness of an environment interacted with a person’s screening ability, and 
that this affected individuals’ desire to work. The effect was much more pronounced in 
hypersensitive individuals.  
The basis for these, and many other articles in this vein or research, is that over-
stimulation, caused by intrusions and distractions, leads to negative behavioral and affective 
responses (e.g., Oldham, Kulik, & Stepina, 1991; Maher & von Hippel, 2005). Less-arousable 
individuals are simply better able to perform in distracting environments (e.g., Belojevic, 
Jakovljevic & Slepcevic, 2003; Yermolayeva-Tomina, 1964). Consequently, hypersensitive 
individuals prefer less sensory-stimulating environments (e.g., workplaces that are quieter, 
include more visual privacy, and so on). Hypersensitives may also require these preferred 
settings in order to achieve optimal performance.  
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High Arousability and Emotional Sensitivity 
Arousability, by definition (assuming the cross-disciplinary definition constructed in this 
paper), includes increased emotionality. Although, the previous subsections have focused on 
hypersensitives’ increased negative sensitivity (e.g., reactions to stress, impact of negative 
workplaces), highly-arousable individuals are also more sensitive to the positive aspects of 
emotionality, namely emotional empathy and creativity (e.g., Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972).  
Mehrabian & Russell (1974) have demonstrated that emotionally empathic individuals 
experience higher arousability, and from the other direction, Mehrabian (1977b) demonstrates 
that highly arousable individuals experience greater affiliative tendency and sensitivity to 
rejection. Kagan et al. (1999) report that highly-sensitive individuals are also more reflective, 
and Aron (2004) adds that hypersensitives show evidence of rapid emotional learning. Extending 
these findings, Kasof (1997) suggests artistic creativity is connected to arousability, since 
creativity is linked with openness to subtlety and emotional empathy (like high arousability). 
Aron & Aron’s (1997) finding that arousable individuals also have vivid dreams and more active 
imaginations helps support this assertion (see also Hicks, Fortin, & Brassington, 2002). Aron 
summarizes:  
…most sensitive persons are highly conscientious in all matters, being aware of 
the consequences of a lapse in their behaviour. They are often highly creative, 
intuitive, empathic, and able to grasp non-verbal cues (for example, the intentions 
of animals, the condition of bodies or plants), appreciative of beauty, and spiritual 
or philosophical rather than material and hedonistic in their orientation to life 
(Aron, 2004: 358). 
 
In conclusion, it is important to realize that high arousability includes increased 
sensitivity to both positive and negative stimuli. Consequently, while highly-sensitive individuals 
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may suffer from information overload, anxiety, or depression their sensitivity may also lead to 
greater emotional empathy, creativity, and imagination.  
High Arousability and Improved Vigilance Performance 
Based upon the inverted-U arousal–performance curve, one might expect hypersensitive 
individuals to perform better at vigilance tasks (since they will be able to maintain higher arousal 
during the inherently low-stimulation task). However, empirical investigations into this are 
inconclusive. While some studies support the conclusion (e.g., Rose et al., 2002; Schmidt et al., 
2004; see Matthews, 1999, for a supportive review) others reject it (e.g., Bakan, 1959, Bullock 
and Gilliland, 1993, Davies & Hockey, 1966; Keister & McLaughlin, 1972; see Koelega, 1992, 
for an unsupportive review). In a meta-analysis, Koelega (1992) found no support for the notion 
that group differences in arousability (specifically extraversion–introversion) contributed to 
performance decrement on vigilance tasks. However, Koelega’s analytic methods were 
criticized, so it is unclear what conclusions can be drawn from his work (see Schmidt et al., 
2004).  
Further, taking into account the complexities of arousal (discussed in the 
“Unidimensional vs. Multidimensional Arousal” subsection of this report), it seems likely that 
different circumstances encourage or inhibit the predicted decrement. Schmidt et al. (2004) drive 
towards this conclusion. Specifically, they explain the inconclusive performance-based results 
are a function of coping strategies or the neurological central control system. Schmidt et al. call 
on researchers to look at outcome differences between groups that are not directly connected to 
performance. For instance, in their specific study, Schmidt et al. successfully used reaction time 
(RT) measures to differentiate between introverts/extroverts on vigilance tasks:  
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The present results can be also interpreted with respect to this control theory of 
arousal. According to the theory extraverts show larger performance decrements 
although they invest more effort than introverts in compensating sub-optimal 
arousal levels. Bearing this in mind, it is interesting to consider the results for 
different performance parameters. It may be that, even after 40 min of time-on-
task, the effort mechanism in extraverts is still effective enough to detect hits, 
though they cannot compensate their performance decrement in RT. Thus, 
differential effort and arousal deficits of extraverts may be detected by some more 
sensitive parameters, even if differential performance deficits do not show up in 
hits (p. 1344).  
 
In summary, differences between arousability groups can be identified in vigilance tasks 
to some extent. However, because hyposensitive individuals can mitigate the negative affect of 
under-arousal (to some extent), direct performance measures may not be sufficiently sensitive to 
detect the group differences in laboratory conditions. Ultimately, it is unclear whether the 
differences in vigilance task performance translate to meaningful performance differences 
outside the laboratory setting.  
Low Arousability and Stimulus Seeking 
According to the optimal level of arousal hypothesis, hyposensitive individuals may 
attempt to mitigate their chronic low arousal by seeking stimulating environments or activities. 
In a variety of settings, researchers have found that people with intrinsically low arousal 
demonstrate stimulus-seeking behaviors. Some stimulus-seeking activities include thrill-seeking, 
such as attraction to dangerous professions (e.g., military pilot) or participation in extreme sports 
(e.g., skydiving); engagement in uninhibited behaviors (particularly for men), such as a 
propensity to drink or engage in alternative sexual behaviors (e.g., Zuckerman, 1971); or 
stimulus-seeking may manifest in antisocial ways. For instance, a significant quantity of research 
has investigated the link between low arousability and criminal (e.g. Farley & Farley, 1972) or 
bullying (e.g., Woods & White, 2005) behavior.  
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While stimulus-seeking tendencies do correlate with low arousability, Mehrabian 
cautions researchers not to assume complete correlation. First, anyone (regardless of their trait 
arousability) can become under-aroused, and consequently, seek stimulation. Second, in addition 
to low intrinsic arousal, other factors contribute to whether a person engages in stimulus-seeking 
behaviors and the specific type of behaviors that are preferred (e.g., Mehrabian 1995). Thus, the 
conclusion is that, heuristically, hyposensitives tend to exhibit stimulus-seeking behaviors; 
however at a deeper level of analysis, this rule-of-thumb is moderated by several caveats.  
Low Arousability and Achievement Task Performance 
Hyposensitive individuals tend to excel over hypersensitives in complex, achievement-
based tasks (e.g., Eysenck & Levey, 1972). As Mehrabian (1977b) explains: “Achievement 
situations involve uncertainty and therefore elicit high levels of arousal” (p. 245). “Higher 
achievers are consequently less aroused while performing high risk (high information rate) tasks 
and are thus likely to outperform low achievers in these situations when the unpleasant 
consequences of failure are especially salient” (p. 245), and “higher achievers tend to screen 
more, which is consistent with their ability to process the higher information rates of 
achievement tasks” (248). Although, Mehrabian (1977b) notes that degradations in the 
performance of highly-arousable individuals are only expected if distractions surface during 
moderately- or highly-complex tasks. This assertion makes sense, given that highly-arousable 
individuals are predicted to perform equally well (or better) on less stimulating jobs, such as 
vigilance tasks (discussed above).  
From the perspective of a hypersensitive person, Jaeger (2004) explains that highly-
arousable individuals can feel overwhelmed and over-stimulated by the pressures of traditional 
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workplaces, and that these feelings may lead to low self-confidence and “a nagging sense of 
being not cut out for the real world.” 
Empirically, this has been well demonstrated by Gilliland et al. (1986). In an analysis of 
the selection criterion for the U.S. Air Force, they reported “Stimulus Screening, Thrill and 
Adventure Seeking, Neuroticism, Type-A Behavior, and General Intelligence showed the most 
promising relationships to [U.S. Air Force Criterion Task Set] performance variables” (p.64). 
Considering that stimulus screening (i.e., arousability), adventure seeking (i.e., sensation-
seeking), neuroticism, and Type-A behavior are all highly inter-correlated and based upon 
general arousability, Gilliland et al.’s work strongly suggests that intelligence and arousability 
are key individual differences related to achievement in high-performance environments. 
Effects of Extreme Arousability: Summary 
Arousal, and by extension arousability, represent foundational cognitive functions. As 
this brief review demonstrates: Numerous outcome differences can be linked to variations in 
arousability. The research reviewed in this chapter shows that hypersensitive people are at a 
greater risk to suffer illness, particularly stress-related illnesses. Hypersensitives are more 
anxious, more neurotic, and more likely to be negatively affected by workplace distractions. 
Positively, hypersensitives also demonstrate more empathy and creativity, and a greater 
affiliative tendency. On the other hand, hyposensitives may engage in stimulus-seeking 
behaviors, which could manifest in many different ways, including a higher likelihood to engage 
in criminal behavior. Hyposensitives also perform better than hypersensitives in achievement-
based environments—where the stress inherent to these settings overwhelms more sensitive 
people. Table 3 further summarizes the findings included in this section.  
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Table 3: Summary of Common Arousability Effects 
Name Description Selected Sources 
Stress and Illness Highly-arousable individuals tend to 
experience more stress and over-stimulation, as 
well as the by-products of these states 
including greater likelihood of developing 
physical illnesses, psychological disorders, 
insomnia, and drug/alcohol abuse.  
Adams (1988)  
Aron (2004) 
Aron, Aron, & Davies (2005) 
Benham (2006) 
Coren (1988) 
Mehrabian (1995)  
Moosman (2002)  
Myin-Germeys & van Os (2007) 
Workplace Preferences Highly-arousable people prefer to work in less 
stimulating places, (e.g., fewer distraction and 
greater visual privacy). Hypersensitives’ 
performance and motivation degrades when 
they are exposed to negative workplace 
conditions. 
Fried (2006)  
Hines and Mehrabian (1979)  
Maher & von Hippel (2005) 
Oldham (1988) 
Oldham, Kulik, & Stepina (1991) 
 
Empathy and Creativity Hypersensitive people tend to exhibit more 
empathy and creativity, and more rapid 
emotional learning than hyposensitive 
individuals. 
Aron, 2004 
Kagan et al. (1999)  
Kasof (1997) 
Mehrabian (1977b)  
Mehrabian & Epstein, 1972).  
Mehrabian & Russell (1974)  
Vigilance Task 
Performance 
There are mixed results regarding arousability 
and vigilance task performance. A logical 
hypothesis is that while highly-arousable 
individuals are naturally better able to perform 
vigilance tasks, less-arousable individuals are 
nonetheless able to exert sufficient effort to 
overcome the affects of suboptimal arousal. 
Matthews, 1999 
Rose et al., 2002 
Schmidt et al., 2004 
c.f., Davies and Hockey, 1966 
c.f., Keister & McLaughlin, 1972 
c.f., Koelega, 1992 
Stimulus Seeking Hyposensitive individuals may attempt to 
mitigate their chronic low arousal by seeking 
out stimulating environments or activities. 
These activities could include extreme sports, 
dangerous professions, or criminal behaviors. 
Zuckerman, 1994 
Achievement Task 
Performance 
Highly-arousable individuals tend to perform 
more poorly in achievement-based (i.e., 
stressful, complex, uncertain) workplaces. 
Eysenck & Levey, 1972 
Gilliland et al. (1986)  
Jaeger (2004)  
Mehrabian (1977b)  
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CHAPTER FOUR: AROUSAL, AROUSABILITY, AND TRAINING 
 
Significant research has explored the affects of (state) arousal on the learning process. 
State arousal derives from the interaction of individuals’ arousability and the task/environment. 
Various characterizations of arousal (e.g., unidimensional, emotionality, reward/punishment 
valenced) have been examined in the context of numerous learning tasks (e.g., classical 
conditioning, vicarious conditioning, recall) and using animal or human populations. For 
instance, well-established research on rats suggests that increasing their arousal (via injected 
hormones) improves their memory retention (e.g., Roozendaal, Carmi, & McGaugh, 1996). In 
regard to human populations the findings are more complex. For humans, investigators have 
typically explored the affects of arousal on three cognitive mechanisms related to learning: 
attention, working memory (WM), and long-term memory (LTM). 
Arousal–Attention Relationship 
Attention represents a complex cognitive process responsible for “(a) orienting to sensory 
events; (b) detecting signals for focal (conscious) processing, and (c) maintaining a vigilant or 
alert state” (Posner & Peterson, 1990: 26). Attention can be focused consciously or 
unconsciously, and an executive control mechanism resolves conflicting demands on attention 
allocation and response tendencies (Posner & Peterson, 1990). 
The first relationship between arousal and attention is straightforward: Arousing stimuli 
garner more attention. People spend more time looking at arousing stimuli (e.g., Lang et al., 
1993), and arousing stimuli produce more cortical activity (e.g., Bradley et al., 2003). Arousing 
stimuli are also distracting. A considerable number of investigations demonstrate that arousing, 
53 
non-task stimuli interfere with primary tasks and compete for attentional resources (Anderson, 
2005; Schimmack & Derryberry, 2005; MacKay et al. 2004; Gronau et al., 2003, Buodo et al., 
2002; Pratto & John, 1991). Many of these studies presented participants with simple tasks (e.g., 
math problems or basic reaction-time measures) while displaying arousing or neutral 
photographs in the periphery. Then, these investigators measured the interference effects of the 
imagery. Other studies used the Emotional Stroop task, in which participants are shown two 
color-coded words. Each word is presented for 100ms, one after another. Typically, participants 
are unable to report the second word if it is presented 200-500ms after the first; however, 
Anderson (2005) demonstrated that if the second word was inherently arousing, then participants 
were more likely to encode it. Further, Anderson found that this effect was related to the arousal-
level—and not the emotional valence—of the word. 
The second relationship to consider is how attentional resources are affected by a 
person’s arousal state. In general, it appears that attentional capacity and arousal form an 
inverted-U relationship, where moderate arousal leads to the greatest attentional capacity 
(Kahneman, 1973; Mandler, 1975). Both sustained and selective attention are affected by a 
person’s arousal state (Das et al., 1994), and under both high and low arousal conditions, 
attentional capacity is attenuated. 
In high-arousal states, a person’s autonomic nervous system activity increases. Mandler 
(1975) suggests that this increase in internal feedback interferes with external cues and competes 
for limited attentional resources. Thus, when individuals experience supraoptimal arousal states, 
their attention narrows and becomes more selective (Easterbrook, 1959). In other words, a 
highly-aroused system focuses more on dominant sources than does a less-aroused system 
(Broadbent, 1971). This is often demonstrated using a dual-task paradigm. Participants are asked 
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to perform two simultaneous tasks, but when their arousal becomes too great they begin to ignore 
the secondary task, which is called “task shedding” (Tsang & Wilson, 1997). When this occurs, 
performance on the secondary tasks, naturally, deteriorates; performance on the primary task 
may remain constant or even improve (Humphreys and Revelle 1984; Anderson and Revelle 
1982; Eysenck 1982). However, performance on the primary task will eventually deteriorate if 
unavailable attentional resources are required.  
Low-arousal states, per se, receive less academic attention. Partially, it is difficult to 
induce low arousal directly, since active tasks (such as experimental procedures) inherently 
contain some arousing stimuli. One approach is to use sleep deprivation. Similar to sustained 
vigilance tasks, low arousal induced by sleep depravation decrements performance; however, 
attentional lapses can be mitigated by internal control. For instance, Drummond and his 
colleagues asked participants to perform arithmetic and verbal learning tasks, with or without 
total sleep deprivation. Although sleep deprivation only modestly inhibited performance, 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) revealed significantly more cognitive activation 
under the sleep deprivation condition. In other words, participants used many more cognitive 
resources to maintain sufficient attention while under the low-arousal, sleep-deprivation state 
(Drummond, Gillin & Brown, 2001). This is consistent with colloquial and subjective reports 
that maintaining attention while experiencing suboptimal arousal requires significant “mental 
effort” (e.g., Kahneman, 1973). However, individuals experiencing low arousal (from sleep 
deprivation) can only sustain their mental effort for a time. Eventually, their performance will 
become unstable as lapses in cognitive function occur. This describes the “state instability” 
hypothesis, which suggests that sleep deprivation hinders performance because sleep-initiating 
55 
mechanisms compete for attentional capacity, consequently impacting mood, cognitive 
performance, and motor function (Doran, Van Dongen, Dinges, 2001).  
Another way to conceptualize low arousal is as boredom (Mikulas & Vodanovich, 1993). 
Specifically, boredom is a state of low arousal combined with dissatisfaction. Sustaining 
attention while experiencing boredom requires individuals to exert “effort” (O’Hanlon, 1981). 
However, as with the sleep deprivation studies, sustained attention under boring conditions can 
only be maintained for a time. The higher “cost of attention” (Portas et al., 1998) eventually 
induces mental fatigue and drowsiness (Babkoff et al., 1991), which inevitably impact 
performance.  
Arousal–WM Relationship 
Working memory (WM) is where incoming information is temporarily stored and 
manipulated before it passes to long-term memory (or else is forgotten). WM suffers from two 
major limitations: capacity and duration. Its capacity, initially defined by Miller’s (1956) classic 
article, is around seven items, and without rehearsal WM’s duration is only about 20-seconds 
long (Peterson & Peterson, 1959). However, as individuals develop expertise, they “chunk” bits 
of information together to form cognitive schema, which are stored in long-term memory. 
Cognitive schema essentially act as a central executive for WM and make its limitations 
irrelevant (Sweller, 2005). Thus, with greater levels of understanding, the processing demands of 
WM reduce.  
Arousal affects WM in predictable ways. First, high arousal diminishes WM’s 
capabilities, most likely because the cognitive activation caused by high arousal places an 
increased processing load on WM (Lupien, Gillin, & Hauger, 1999). The implication of this is 
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that any information processing that requires the use of WM becomes disrupted under 
supraoptimal arousal conditions (Berlyne, 1960; Zajonc, 1965). “Automatic” tasks (i.e., tasks in 
which a person has expertise) do not require WM processing, and are consequently not 
significantly hindered by high arousal (Hasher & Zacks, 1979; Humphreys and Revelle; 1984). 
Almost by definition, individuals engaged in training are non-experts; thus, high-arousal levels 
significantly impact training effectiveness by reducing trainees’ abilities to transform the 
incoming information into relevant knowledge structures.  
In low-arousal situations, WM may also be impaired. As discussed in the previous 
subsection; low-arousal conditions require individuals to exert greater mental effort in order to 
maintain average performance. This mental effort interferes with attentional resources, and it 
also places demands on WM processing. More specifically, neurological studies have 
demonstrated that both inherent low arousal, and low arousal caused by sustained attention, lead 
to activation of the thalamus, which in turn, intrudes on WM capabilities (Barch et al., 1997; 
Callicott et al., 1999; Manoach et al., 2003; Kinomura et al., 1996; Coull, 1998) .  
Arousal–LTM Relationship 
Arousal’s influence on memory encoding 
Encoding is the act of creating new memories in long-term memory (LTM); it is sensitive 
to arousal affects both during, and immediately after, the encoding process. Significant quantities 
of research continue to support the notion that emotionally-charged (positive or negative) events 
are remembered longer than emotionally-neutral ones (e.g., McGaugh, 2000; Safer et al., 1998; 
Cahill, 2000; Schafe et al., 2001; McGaugh & Roozendaal, 2002; Bradley et al., 2002). This 
finding makes logical sense and is supported theoretically. Specifically, the action decrement 
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theory (Walker, 1958) suggests that high-arousal situations induce (a) longer-lasting memories 
but (b) also initially produce greater inhibition of retrieval (see Eysenck, 1976, for a review and 
explanation of the neurophysiological basis of this theory). Consequently, low-arousal stimuli 
are better retained for short retention periods (15-20 minutes) while high-arousal stimuli are 
better retained for longer periods.  
Numerous investigations have explored this theory with mixed results. In an attempt to 
clarify the findings, Schwartz (1975) reexamined the results and differentiated verbatim (e.g., the 
position of a word on a word list) versus semantic (e.g., the meaning of a word from a list) recall. 
He reports that high-arousal may facilitate long-term verbatim recall, but that it inhibits long-
term semantic recall. Eysenck (1976) further adds that “at short retention intervals, high arousal 
may facilitate the retrieval of responses but hinder the retrieval of appropriate associative links. 
The hypothesis that high levels of arousal may have an enhancing effect on retention at short 
retention intervals, provided that subjects do not have to retrieve associative links, is further 
supported by those studies of short-term recognition memory already discussed in which high 
arousal led to superior recognition performance” (p. 393).  
Although the above-cited studies are decades old, contemporary research has continued 
to support (and argue about) the action decrement theory and its moderators. For instance, Steidl, 
Mohi-uddin, & Anderson (2006) recently evaluated the affects of arousal during learning tasks, 
and found that for procedural tasks higher arousal during encoding (a) impairs initial acquisition, 
(b) has no effect on medium-term recall (i.e., one-week later), and yet (c) enhances long-term 
recall (i.e., 3-months later). However, these findings only hold true for dominant information or 
“easy” learning tasks. Complex (i.e., semantic) learning remains inhibited by high arousal.  
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Another case where arousal may affect memory is when arousal is induced after a 
learning event. If an extremely strong, negative emotional experience (i.e., stressful arousal) is 
created, it may impair the retrieval of information unrelated to the arousing event, producing 
retrograde amnesia (e.g., Loftus & Burns, 1982; Kirschbaum et al., 1996; de Quervain et al., 
1998; Wolf et al., 2001; Payne et al., 2002). In the context of learning this implies that if a 
stressful educational event follows some other educational event, then the learning that 
transpired during the first event may be “overwritten” by memories created in the second. For 
example, Diamond et al. (1996) show this empirically. Diamond and his colleagues trained rats 
to find their food in a maze, and immediately following this, trained the rats to perform a water-
maze task. After the rats learned the water-maze, their original spatial memory of their food’s 
location was significantly impaired. However, this effect only occurred if the rats were naïve to 
immersion in water; after the rats became accustomed to water exposure, training in the water-
maze no longer interfered with their original spatial memories. Thus, the stressful (i.e., high 
arousal) nature of the second learning experience caused the rats to “forget” some of their 
recently-encoded memories. Diamond et al. suggest that this phenomenon helps the memory 
processing center of the brain (i.e., the hippocampus) “reset” in order to focus on the new 
information being experienced. 
Arousal’s influence on memory recall 
Arousal experienced at the time of recall can influence how effectively memories are 
accessed. Consider the tip-of-the-tongue phenomenon where specific information is unreachable 
when a person is highly motivated to access it; yet, as soon as he/she abandons the recall attempt, 
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the information appears (Schacter, 2001). Or consider how frequently individuals report retrieval 
failures when experiencing the supraoptimal arousal caused by test anxiety (Eysenck, 1976).  
Like memory encoding, semantic memory (versus verbatim memory) recall appears most 
affected by supraoptimal arousal. While high levels of arousal may actually facilitate high-
dominance recall (i.e., verbatim recall), high arousal inhibits low-dominance recall (i.e., 
secondary or semantic recall) (Eysenck, 1976; 1975; 1974). Thus, at short retention intervals, 
high arousal facilitates recognition (Archer & Margolin, 1970; Schwarz, 1974; Wesner, 1972) 
and free recall (Corteen, 1969; Kaplan, Kaplan, & Sampson, 1968; Maltzman et al., 1966; 
Sampson, 1969; Schönpflug & Beike, 1964; Schwartz, 1975), but it inhibits deeper learning 
(Howarth & H. Eysenck, 1968; Kleinsmith & Kaplan, 1963, 1964; McLean, 1969; Osborne, 
1972). For example, Eysenck (1976) demonstrated that high arousal inhibits search processes, 
causing participants to focus only on the most readily-accessible sources of information. 
Downstream, this not only leads to reduced recall of semantic memories, but also affects 
complex processes that require “deep” information, such as decision-making or creative problem 
solving. 
Supraoptimal arousal induced sometime before a recall task may also affect retrieval. For 
instance, de Quervain et al. (1998) found that the rats’ performance in a water maze became 
impaired if they were subjected to stress (i.e., a foot shock) 30 minutes before testing. However, 
the rats’ performance was not impaired if the stress was induced two minutes, or four hours, 
before the test.  
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Arousal and Learning Summary 
Following the inverted-U pattern, it appears that moderate arousal (created via the 
interaction of external stimuli and a person’s internal state) is most ideal for most training 
settings. Under supraoptimal arousal conditions, individuals’ attention narrows, their ability to 
process incoming information is inhibited, and their depth of processing is reduced (Eysenck, 
1976). During acquisition, high arousal focuses individuals’ attention on physical characteristics 
of the presented information (i.e., dominant and verbatim processing), causing semantic and 
peripheral information to be ignored. Consequently, memories associated with high-arousal 
situations may be strongly remembered, for a long duration; however, these memories are often 
less accurate, include far fewer contextual details, and may even become confused with other 
memories (e.g., Schmolck, Buffalo, & Squire, 2000; Christianson & Loftus, 1991; Kensinger, 
Piguet, Krendl, Corkin, 2005). During recall, individuals experiencing high arousal are more 
likely to access “easy” information (i.e., readily accessible stored information). Thus, limiting 
their recall of deeper (e.g., unusual or semantic) information, and inhibiting their problem-
solving capabilities. Under suboptimal arousal conditions, individuals must exert “mental effort” 
to sustain their attention. This eventually leads to performance decrements both because sleep-
inducing mechanisms compete for attentional resources and because thalamic activation caused 
by the mental effort uses some of WM’s capacity. Consequently, optimum cognitive functioning, 
which should lead to the most favorable training conditions, occurs when individuals are only 
moderately aroused. Arousal and its relationship to training effectiveness appears to form the 
classic, inverted-U relationship. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: HYPOTHESES AND METHODS 
 
As discussed in Chapter 2, contemporary and future adaptive training systems are likely 
to be computer-based and incorporate both models of behavior/cognitive states and performance 
data. Thus far, adaptive multimedia systems have failed to account for individual differences a 
priori. At best, individual differences are indirectly “teased out” based upon observed 
performance measures, or in rare cases they are inferred from measures of neuro-physiology. Is it 
possible that ignoring the influence of individual differences contributes to the attenuation of 
performance observed with contemporary intelligent/adaptive training systems? It seems 
plausible that using individual difference information to (a) form individual baselines and (b) 
inform system responses (so that they interpret and respond to observable data more 
appropriately) will lead to improved system performance.  
Before this notion can be tested, though, system designers need a reliable way to measure 
arousability. Currently, the measurement of this arousability is confusing. As the last chapter 
demonstrated, the arousability construct has been identified in many different social-science 
areas, under a number of different monikers, and using many diverse measurement approaches. It 
remains unclear if the construct is unidimensional or multidimensional, and if it is 
multidimensional which factors it includes. Further, it is unclear which measurement device(s) 
is(are) best suited to this application. This drives the need to first examine existing measures of 
arousability more closely. By looking across constructs and measures, a more robust, better 
factored apparatus may be created. Thus: 
Hypothesis 1: By factor analyzing existing measures of arousability a more 
reliable, more valid apparatus can be created. This apparatus will also help clarify 
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the factor structure of arousability, which will make it more suitable for use in 
applied training systems. 
 
Based upon the literature review found in previous chapters, it is clear that a person’s 
inherent arousability, combined with task demands, generates his/her arousal state. It is also plain 
that arousal states significantly affect individuals’ cognitive functioning, including their 
receptivity for training. Consequently, optimum training occurs when trainees experience the 
most favorable (i.e., median) arousal states; however, if all trainees experience the same tasks 
demands, but they have different inherent arousal levels, then some of the population must 
experience nonoptimal arousal.  
In regard to multimedia (including simulation-based) training, supraoptimal arousal is 
more likely to be an issue than suboptimal arousal, because of the inherently high-information 
design of most multimedia systems. As the last chapter outlined, supraoptimal arousal leads to 
narrowed attention, limited working memory capacity, and a focus on verbatim (rather than 
semantic) information. In short, supraoptimal arousal limits individuals’ depth of processing. In 
the context of training, this most likely means that highly-arousable individuals will appear to 
learn training material, but have a shallower understanding of it than less-arousable individuals. 
For instance, consider a situation where people undergo a training exercise, such as military 
warfighters learning new operations. Following the training, individuals’ understanding will 
most likely be tested using standardized exams, structured field exercises, or other measures of 
verbatim (i.e., recall, procedural, or rules-base) knowledge. Thus, individuals across all 
arousability-levels will likely pass these evaluations, and under normal field conditions, all 
trainees are likely to maintain sufficient performance. However, when field conditions change 
and the trainees are forced to make difficult decisions or exercise creative problems solving, then 
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highly-arousable individuals’ deficiency of understanding will become clear. Consequently, this 
leads to the second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Highly-arousable individuals will demonstrate poorer semantic 
understanding of (highly-arousing) multimedia-based training, as compared to 
less-arousable individuals. However, all participants will likely show equal 
verbatim understanding of the training.  
 
Two studies will be conducted to test the above hypotheses. First, existing survey-based 
measures of arousability will be researched and comparatively analyzed, and a factor analysis 
across relevant existing measures will be conducted. Second, the measurement device developed 
from the first study will be used to test the second hypothesis in an experimental training setting.   
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CHAPTER SIX: ANALYSIS OF EXISTING MEASURES (STUDY 1) 
Subjective Measures of Arousability 
Individual differences in arousability have been theorized for as long as arousal has been 
studied (Mehrabian, 1977b); however, measuring trait arousal initially proved challenging 
because most methods were unable to separate confounding state variables. Early measures of 
general (state) arousal used physiological (e.g., galvanic skin response) measures, but as 
Mehrabian (1977) points out, these techniques lacked widespread support and were cumbersome 
to use. Fortunately, subjective measures of arousal are quite effective. [Although today’s 
physiological measures have advanced and are often used in the service of arousal-related 
research, a discussion of these methods is outside the scope of this report.] In fact, Thayer (1989) 
has argued that subjective estimates of energetic arousal are the most likely to be associated with 
performance—more so than even psycho-physiological measures.  
In 1967, Thayer developed the Activation Deactivation-Adjective Check List (AD-ACL), 
a verbal-response measure of (state) arousal that correlated with the then-current physiological 
measures (Thayer, 1967; see also Thayer, 1989). This was one of the first self-report, survey-
based measures of arousal. Shortly thereafter, Mehrabian and Russell began developing a 
subjective measure of (trait) arousability. 
Mehrabian’s Trait Arousability Scale 
Mehrabian and Russell (Mehrabian & Russell 1973; Mehrabian, 1977a) first created an 
apparatus to detect individual differences in stimulus screening ability (i.e., the ability to screen-
out low priority stimuli, which is the direct opposite of high trait arousability). The Stimulus 
Screening Questionnaire (SSQ) is a 40-item, 9-point scale that measures individual differences in 
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the degree of screening-out irrelevant stimuli in the environment. Individual’s scores are 
summed across all items, and scores above 25 indicate high screening ability (i.e., low trait 
arousability). Items in the scale are all highly inter-correlated, even though they describe several 
different aspects of stimulus sensitive (e.g., thermal screening, arousability to novel settings, 
habituation rate). The Kuder–Richardson (1937) reliability coefficient for this scale is 0.92 
(Mehrabian, 1977a).  
As Mehrabian’s research progressed, he incorporated trait arousability into his 
Pleasantness-Arousability-Dominance (PAD) temperament model of personality, and he refined 
and transformed the SSQ measure into the Trait Arousability Scale (TAS) (Mehrabian, 1996a, 
1996b). The current TAS is a completely reworked version of the original SSQ. (But since 
stimulus screening ability is the direct opposite of trait arousability, the scale still measures both 
constructs.) 
The full-length TAS is a reliable 34-item, 9-point survey (α = .90; Mehrabian, 1995). It 
incorporates both positively- and negatively-worded statements, which controls for response bias 
(i.e., where some individuals to tend to agree, or disagree, with all statements). To calculate an 
individual’s score, the negative statements are recoded, and then all the responses are summed. 
The norm mean score on the survey is 30, with a standard deviation of 33. However, statistically-
significant sex differences do exist: As a whole, women tend to exhibit greater arousability (m = 
43; σ = 32) than men (m = 18; σ = 34) (Mehrabian, 1994).  
Both the SSQ and the TAS have been well-received by academic investigators. These 
measures have been used in the service of diverse research, including predicting job performance 
(e.g., Gilliland, Schlegel, & Dannels, 1986; Mehrabian, 1977b), investigating workplace design 
(e.g., Fried, 2006; Oldham, Kulik, & Stepina, 1991; Oldham, 1988; Hines & Mehrabian, 1979), 
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predicting fear responses (e.g., Sparks, 1989), understanding eating disorders (e.g., Craig, Hollis, 
& Dess, 2003; Mehrabian & Riccioni, 1986) and analyzing mental illnesses (e.g., Dinzeo et. al., 
2004; Mehrabian, 1977b; DePalma & Nideffer, 1977).  
The TAS is protected by copyright and can be purchased for a small fee from Mehrabian, 
directly. His web site, including ordering information, is located www.kaaj.com/psych. 
Vando’s Reducer–Augmenter Scale 
Vando developed the Reducer–Augmenter Scale (RAS) to study sensory stimulation in 
the context of pain tolerance (Vando, 1969, 1974). The RAS correlates moderately with other 
measures of arousability, such as extraversion (Dragutinovich, 1987a, 1987b; Kohn et al., 1987; 
Kohn, Hunt, Cowles & Davis, 1986), strength of the nervous system (Dragutinovich, 1987a, 
1987b; Kohn et al., 1987), and sensation-seeking (Dragutinovich, 1987a, 1987b; Kohn et al., 
1987). More recently, Clapper (1990) revised the RAS and named the updated version the 
Revised Reducer–Augmenter Scale (RRAS; α = 0.79). The RRAS adds a six-pointed scale and 
includes updated wording for some items. 
The RAS (or RRAS) has been criticized because it assumes that arousability is inherently 
linked with stimulus seeking tendencies (Kohn, 1987.) More specifically, the scale is worded in 
such a way that agreement with high sensation-seeking items is always scored as a reducing 
response and vice versa. As Kohn asserts, “the RAS is an alternative measure of sensation 
seeking” (p. 237). 
Kohn further argues that the RAS includes a puzzling factor structure, consisting of three 
partially-correlated scales interpreted as Musical Augmenting–Reducing, General Life-style 
Augmenting–Reducing, and Physical Thrill Seeking. Due to these problems with the RAS, 
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“notably its built-in sensation-seeking content and its overrepresentation of content parochially 
relevant to music” (Kohn, 1987: 238), it has not become a highly-used measure. However, the 
reducer–augmenter paradigm (presented in the previous chapter) has been accepted in a variety 
of fields.  
Kohn’s Reactivity Scale 
The Kohn’s (1985) Reactivity Scale (RS) consists of 24 items (α = .73 to .83) that assess 
an individual’s level of ‘reactivity’ or central nervous system arousability. It uses a 5-point 
Likert format. The RS has been mainly used to determine individual differences in response to 
pain (e.g., Fillingim et al., 2005; Edwards & Fillingim, 1999; Dubreuil & Kohn, 1986), and as 
one might expect, high scores on the RS (i.e., high arousability) correlate negatively with pain 
tolerance (Dubreuil & Kohn, 1986). The RS has been used in studies of hypervigilance (e.g., 
Ness et al., 2005; McDermid et al., 1996), with which it is also correlated. However, even the 
hypervigilance studies have been conducted within the larger context of pain and medical 
research. Outside of these fields, the RS has received very little attention, most likely because the 
RS fails to add value beyond the use of already-established measures (such as the TAS and 
HSP). The RS is available to researchers in Kohn (1985). 
Satow’s Environmental Stimulus Screening scale 
Satow (1987) created a 60-item questionnaire that divides sensitivity to stimuli into four 
categories: lower sensory threshold, more rapid perception of a stimulus, and lower tolerance for 
intense or prolonged stimulation. The development of this apparatus followed Satow’s theory of 
stimulus preference, which outline four preferences-types across a continuum, ranging from high 
threshold for stimulation but poor perception of subtly, to low threshold for stimulation but high 
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perception of subtly. While Satow reports that the total ESS accounts for 15-18% of total 
variance observed, its factor structure remains questionable. Each orthogonal factor accounted 
for less than 2-4% of the variance, which is generally considered statistically insignificant. 
Additionally, Satow appears to create the factors somewhat pell-mell, rather than using 
theoretically-sound rationale.  
Most likely because its psychometric failings, the ESS has not been highly used by other 
researchers. Satow and her colleagues have used the scale in the research of pain sensitivity, 
though (e.g., Satow & Taniguchi, 1989). The ESS is freely available to researchers, and can be 
found in Satow (1987).  
Coren’s Arousal Predisposition Scale 
Coren’s (1988) Arousal Predisposition Scale (APS) was originally designed to predict 
individuals’ likelihood to experience disrupted sleep, based upon the theory that some instances 
of insomnia stem from cognitive hyper-arousal. The APS is a 12-item, five-point questionnaire. 
It has reasonably high internal consistency (α = .83) and moderate correlations with various 
indicators of sleep difficulty, such as restlessness and delayed sleep onset. Overall, the APS 
accounts for about 20% of the predicative variance of sleep difficulty (Coren, 1988). Also, like 
the TAS, APS results are moderated by sex, with women tending to be more highly arousable 
(Deane, Henderson, Mahar, & Saliba, 1998).  
Since its inception, investigators have used the APS to successfully measure individual 
differences in arousability (e.g., Coren & Mah, 1993; Dorado & Fernández, 1997), as well as 
predict differences in cognitive performance while being distracted (e.g., Coren & Aks, 1991), 
antisocial behavior (e.g., Coren, 1999; Woods & White, 2004), and impulse aggression (e.g., 
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Houston & Stanford, 2001). Primarily, the APS has been most utilized in the sleep disorders and 
antisocial behavior literatures. However, the scale has yet to achieve real prominence, and as a 
whole researchers seem reluctant to use of the APS for arousability studies. Deane et al. (1998) 
suggest that the scale has not been sufficiently empirically validated, and that this lack 
discourages researchers from using it (see also Roy & Viveiros, 2003). The APS is available for 
researchers and can be found in Coren (1988). 
Aron and Aron’s Highly Sensitive Person scale 
Aron and Aron’s (1997) Highly Sensitive Person (HSP) survey is a 27-item, 7-point 
questionnaire that measures individuals’ sensitivity to subtle stimuli and their ability to become 
distracted. Reliability measures of the scale are between α = .85 and α = .87 (Aron & Aron, 
1997). The HSP scale includes items related to sensory over-stimulation, nervousness in social 
settings, and response to distractions; however, like the TAS and SSQ, the HSP appears to be a 
unidimensional measure despite its diversity of items. All items on the HSP are positively 
worded, and individuals’ scores are calculated by finding the mean of their responses. Norm 
mean scores are around 4.38, with standard deviations of around 0.74. Unlike the TAS, sex and 
gender differences do not significantly impact the HSP scoring (Aron & Aron, 1997). 
The HSP scale has been used in several areas of research, including Aron and Aron’s 
own investigations into introversion and shyness (e.g., Aron, Aron, & Davies, 2005; Aron, 
2004a; Aron & Aron, 1997), highly-sensitive people and love (e.g., Aron, 2004b; Aron, 2001), 
and highly-sensitive children (e.g., Aron, 2002). Other researchers have built-upon the Aron’s 
research and explored high-sensitivity and work (e.g., Jaeger, 2004), gifted children (e.g., 
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Mendaglio, 2003; Fornia & Frame, 2001), social anxiety (e.g., Hofmann & Bitran, 2007), eating 
disorders (e.g., Shapiro, 2006), and anxiety and stress (e.g., Benham, 2006; Shapiro, 2005).  
The HSP survey is freely available for researchers. The Arons present an abbreviated 
version of the scale on their web site (www.hsperson.com), and the complete survey can be 
found in Aron and Aron (1997), as well as a reprint in Aron (2006). 
Some Related Measures 
The following measures are each partially related to arousability and, to some extent, can 
be used to assess it. They are provided here as examples of related constructs and measurement 
approaches but are not recommended for the sole evaluation of trait arousability. 
Arousal Seeking (or Avoidance) 
 Measures of arousal seeking/avoidance have been used to measure trait arousability. 
Based upon the theory of optimal arousal, individuals who are easily over-aroused (i.e., high 
arousability) should display arousal-avoidance behaviors, while individuals who are perpetually 
under-aroused (i.e., low arousability) should display stimulus-seeking behaviors. Thus, measures 
of stimulus-seeking should be able to identify high and low arousability. Several arousal-seeking 
questionnaires exist, including Zuckerman’s Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman et al., 1978; 
Zuckerman, 1994), Mehrabian’s Arousal Seeking Tendency (Mehrabian & Russell, 1973; 
Mehrabian, 1978), Pearson’s (1970) Novelty Experiencing Scale, the Arnett Inventory of 
Sensation Seeking (Arnett, 1994), Change Seeker Index (Garlington & Shimota, 1964), and the 
Brief Sensation Seeking Scale (Hoyle et al., 2002). Components of other popular measures 
sometimes also include arousal-seeking scales, such as the impulsive sensation seeking subscale 
from the Zuckerman–Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire (Zuckerman et al., 1993), the novelty 
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seeking subscale from Cloninger’s (1987) factor-7 model, or the arousal avoidance subscale of 
the Telic-Dominance Scale (Morgatroyd et al., 1978).  
 Zuckerman and his colleagues’ work has been highly influential in the science of 
sensation seeking. They developed the Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman et al., 1978; 
Zuckerman, 1994), an extensively-used device now in its fifth iteration (SSS-V). The SSS-V (α = 
0.83 to 0.86) includes 40-items in forced-choice format. In addition to producing a general 
sensation-seeking score, the SSS-V includes four subscales: thrill and adventure seeking, 
experience seeking, disinhibition, and boredom susceptibility. Stimulus seeking tendencies are 
linked to many outcomes, such as extraversion, psychopathy, need for change, and hypomania 
(Zuckerman, 1972). The SSS-V is freely available to researchers from Zuckerman (1994).  
However, as mentioned in the previous chapter, sensation seeking and arousability are 
not correlated one-hundred percent. Other factors influence an individual’s sensation-seeking 
tendency, and it not appropriate to assume that all sensation-seekers (or avoiders) have low (or 
high) arousability. 
Distractibility and Attentional Style 
Siddle and Mangan (1971) showed that distractibility was correlated with initial 
amplitude of the orienting response, slower speed of habituation, and neuroticism. Consequently, 
self-report measures of distractibility (a key characteristic of high arousability) could also be 
used to study arousability. Many different measures of distractibility exist; for instance, 
Weinstein (1978) developed the noise sensitivity survey; Bowsher, Johnson, and Robinson 
(1966) developed a scale to measure intrusion; and Aks (1988) created a measure of perceived 
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distractibility. (Later Aks contributed to the Arousal Predisposition Scale; Paulhus, Aks, & 
Coren, 1990.)  
Similarly, measures of attentional style could be employed to assess arousability, such as 
the Tellegen Absorption Scale (TAS; Tellegen, 1982; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974); the 
Differential Attentional Processes Inventory (DAPI; Yanchar, 1983; Crawford et al., 1993), and 
the Test of Attentional and Interpersonal Style (TAIS; Nideffer, 1976).  
The Tellegen Absorption Scale (α = .88) consists of 34 true/false statements about 
individuals’ involvement in activities, and it is included as one of the 11 subscales of the 
Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (Tellegen, 1982). The Differential Attentional 
Processes Inventory (α = 0.88, Yanchar, 1983) is comprised of 40 items related to focused 
attention, split-attention, and distractibility; it includes four subscales: moderately focused 
attention, extremely focused attention, dual attention cognitive-physical, and dual attention 
cognitive-physical.  
Nideffer’s (1976) Test of Attentional and Interpersonal Style (TAIS) assesses attention 
and arousal, and their direct relationships with performance. The TAIS consists of 144 items 
broken into 17 subscales, including measures of internal and external overload. The median 
correlation within and across scales is .53 (Nideffer, 1976). Although, some have questioned the 
sensitivity or factor analytical methods of the TAIS (e.g., Van Schoyck & Grasha, 1981; 
Vallerand, 1983), it has shown predictive validity for describing athletes behaviors (e.g., 
‘choking’ or finding the ‘zone’) while under pressure (e.g., Nideffer, 1976). However, the TAIS 
is very broad, and includes many factors unrelated to arousability (e.g., self-esteem, intellectual 
expression, physical orientation, and so on). Also, since it was developed for athletes, its 
immediate usefulness seems primarily confined to sports psychology (e.g., Abernethy, Summers, 
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& Ford, 1998), although Enhanced Performance Systems who market and distribute the TAIS, 
claim it has been successfully used business, military, and education as well (see 
EPSystemsCanada, 2008).  
Personality 
Some personality measures include subscales related to arousability. Notably, these 
measures include the strength of excitation subscale of the Strelau (1972) Temperament 
Inventory, the extraversion subscale from either the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI-E; 
Eysenck & Eysenck, 1968) or the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ-E; Eysenck & 
Eysenck, 1975), Mehrabian (1978) Pavlovian Temperament Survey (PTS), Mehrabian PAD 
temperament inventory, Cloninger’s (1987) factor-7 model, the Adult Temperament 
Questionnaire (ATQ Evans & Rothbart, 2007),  
However, some of these alternative measures are poor arousability analyses. First, the 
temperament scales’ focus is broader than arousal, and individual subscales may not be validated 
to ‘stand on their own.’ Additionally, concerns have been raised about individual subscales. For 
instance, Strelau’s inventory suffers from questionable validity, and specific studies related to 
arousability have failed to statistically support relationships between measures of arousal and 
scores on the inventory (Kohn, 1987; e.g., Carlier, 1985; Gilliland, 1985; and Strelau & Terelak, 
1974). As another example, the Eysenck measures split extraversion into two components: 
impulsivity and sociability; however, as discussed in previous chapters, it is unclear whether 
arousability is adequately correlated with sociability.  
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Trait Anxiety 
Measures of trait anxiety may seem like viable apparatus for analyzing trait arousability. 
Certainly, arousable individuals often exhibit persistently high anxiety, and conversely, patients 
who suffer from pathological anxiety typically complain that stimulation causes tension 
(Cameron, 1944). Anxiety is a disease of over-arousal (Malmo, 1957). People who are 
predisposed toward hyper-reactivity may more easily suffer from pathological anxiety; however, 
anyone (regardless of their arousability characteristics) has the capacity to become over-
stimulated, and thus suffer from anxiety. 
Consequently, there is a partial correlation between trait arousability and trait anxiety 
(Spielberger, Gorsuch, & Lushene, 1970). Lafreniere and her colleagues (1993) suggest that the 
interaction between arousability and telic-dominance interact to create trait anxiety; thus, while it 
is likely that trait arousability and trait anxiety are related and often observed together, measures 
of trait anxiety are not completely predictive of arousability (and vice versa).  
Subjective Measures of Arousability: Summary 
Many different self-response apparatus exist to measure trait arousability. It appears that 
the most suitable questionnaires are the Trait Arousability Scale (TAS; Mehrabian, 1995) and the 
Highly Sensitive Person scale (HSP; Aron & Aron, 1997). Some scales, such as the 
Environmental Sensory Stimuli questionnaire (Satow, 1986) or the Arousal Predisposition Scale 
(APS; Coren, 1988) fall a little short, psychometrically. Meanwhile, other validated measures, 
such as the Sensation Seeking Scale (Zuckerman, 1994), only partially assess the arousability 
construct. Table 4 summarizes the most useful primary and partially-related self-response 
measures of arousability.  
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Table 4: Summary of Arousability Questionnaires (Alphabetical)* 
Scale Description Reliability Availability 
Arousal Predisposition 
Scale (APS) 
12-item, 5-point scale that 
measures individuals’ trait 
cognitive arousal 
α = .83 Freely available from 
Coren (1988) 
Arousal Seeking 
Tendency 
(AST-II)  
32-item, 9-point scale that 
measures individuals’ 
preferred arousal level 
α = .93  Mehrabian 
(1978; AST-II) 
Brief Sensation Seeking 
Scale (BSSS) 
10-item, 5-point scale that 
was derived from the 
SSS-V; it is suitable for 
use with adolescents 
α = .74 Freely available from 
Hoyle et al. (2002) 
Change Seeker Index 
(CSI)  
95-item, true/false style 
scale that measures 
individuals’ need for 
variation stimulus inputs  
α = .80 to .85 Garlington 
& Shimota (1964) 
Differential Attentional 
Processes Inventory 
(DAPI) 
40-item, 7-point scale that 
measures moderately 
focused attention, 
extremely focused 
attention, dual attention 
cognitive-physical, and 
dual attention cognitive-
physical.  
α = .88 Yanchar (1983) 
Crawford et al. (1993) 
Environmental Sensory 
Stimuli scale  
60-item, 7-point scale that 
measures sensory 
threshold, rapidity of 
perception, and tolerance 
for intense or prolonged 
stimulation  
Not given Freely available from 
Satow (1986) 
Highly Sensitive Person 
(HSP)  
27-item, 7-point scale that 
measures individuals’ 
sensitivity to subtle 
stimuli and their ability to 
become distracted 
α = .85 to .87  Freely available from 
Aron & Aron (1997); 
reprinted in Aron (2006) 
Novelty Experiencing 
Scale (NES)  
80-item, like/dislike-
response scale that 
measures assesses a 
approach-avoidance to 
novel experiences 
α = .87 Pearson (1970) 
Reactivity Scale (RS) 24-item, 5-point scale that 
measures individuals’ 
central nervous system 
arousability 
α = .73 to .83 Freely available from 
Kohn (1985) 
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Revised Reducer–
Augmenter Scale (RRAS) 
34-item, forced-choice 
style scale that measures 
sensory stimulation in the 
context of pain tolerance  
α = .79  Clapper (1990)  
(Original form from 
Vando, 1969, 1974)  
 
Sensation Seeking Scale 
(SSS-V) 
40-item, forced choice 
style scale that measures 
individual’s need for 
varied, novel, and 
complex sensations  
α = .83 to .86 Freely available from 
Zuckerman (1994) 
Stimulus Screening 
Questionnaire (SSQ)  
40-item, 9-point scale that 
measures individuals’ 
abilities to screening-out 
irrelevant stimuli  
α = 0.92 
 
This scale has been 
updated and replaced by 
the TAS  
Telic-Dominance Scale 42-item measure of a 
number of serious-
minded, planning, and 
arousal-seeking 
α = .84 Freely available from 
Morgatroyd et al. (1978) 
Tellegen Absorption 
Scale (TAS) 
34-item true/false scale 
that measures individuals’ 
involvement in activities  
α = .88 Tellegen (1982) 
Test of Attentional and 
Interpersonal Style 
(TAIS) 
144-item, 17-subscale 
measure of attentional 
processes, physiological 
arousal, and performance 
(designed for athletes) 
α = .53 Available for purchase 
from Enhanced 
Performance Systems at 
www.enhanced-
performance.ca  
Trait Arousability Scale 
(TAS)  
 
34-item, 9-point survey 
measures individuals’ 
patterns of arousal 
response to high-
information events 
α = .90  Available for purchase 
from Mehrabian at 
www.kaaj.com/psych 
Zuckerman–Kuhlman 
Personality Questionnaire 
(ZKPQ) 
5-point, 5-factor 
personality scale that 
includes a measure of 
impulsive sensation 
seeking (ImpSS) 
α = .82 to .87 (Zuckerman 
& Kuhlman, 2000). 
Zuckerman et al. (1993) 
* Details and citations related to each measures’ reliability and availably are presented earlier in this chapter.  
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Study 1: Factor Analysis Across Existing Measures 
The purpose of this study is to address Hypothesis 1, which suggests that by looking 
across various existing constructs and measures of arousability, a more robust, better factored 
apparatus may be created. Two of the best subjective measures of arousability appear to be 
Mehrabian and the Arons’ surveys. While their two lines of similar research have uncovered 
comparable results, their work has been applied to very different fields. Thus, these two 
measures were selected for inclusion in this study. Further, some items from Satow’s (1987) 
Environmental Sensory Stimuli Scale were selected. Even though Satow’s scale failed to achieve 
psychometric validity, the items from her survey do appear to analyze sensory sensitivity for the 
environment stimuli, directly—a component less emphasized in the other measures. As such, it 
was hypothesized that items from this measure might make a useful addition to the optimized 
measurement instrument. 
Method 
Participants were recruited from the University of Central Florida’s undergraduate classes 
(N = 622) and asked to complete the HSP scale (Aron & Aron, 1997), the TAS (Mehrabian, 
1995), and a portion of Satow’s Environmental Sensory Stimuli Scale (1986). As mentioned 
above, the ESS factors were included because they more directly question reactions caused by 
diverse environmental stimuli. However, the complete ESS was not used for several reasons. 
First, the overall scale failed to achieve sufficient reliability. Second, many items on the scale are 
highly redundant; for instance, one item reads “I like vivid colors,” while the following item says 
“I like somber colors.” Third, some of the items seem strange and/or are not clearly related to 
arousability; translating the scale from its original Japanese into English might be to blame. 
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Consider these items, for instance: “I like working to the rhythm of stamping feet, clapping 
hands or whistling,” “I like Hawaiian music,” or “I like to look down at rapids from a bridge.” 
The preceding items most likely would not clearly relate to the conceptualization of arousability 
used in this investigation. Finally, for practical reasons (i.e., to minimize the time required to 
complete the experiment), it seemed most practical to include only a relevant subset of questions. 
Redundant or theoretically less-relevant items were excluded, and in the end, ten items were 
selected. These items are listed in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Selected items from the Environmental Sensory Stimuli Scale (Satow, 1987)  
Item 1 I like working in an office where background music is playing. 
Item 2 I have no trouble in reading in noisy surroundings, e.g., when a radio or loud music is playing. 
Item 3 I am sensitive to sounds, even the smallest noises annoy me. 
Item 4 I can’t sleep in a room unless it is pitch-black. 
Item 5 I am sensitive to pain. 
Item 6 I am sensitive to small changes in temperature. 
Item 7 I am sensitive to small changes in humidity. 
Item 8 I am sensitive to small differences in the touch of clothes. 
Item 9 I am sensitive to odors. 
Item 10 I can detect even the smallest movement of air. 
 
Participation in the experiment was entirely voluntary, and participants were empowered 
to quit at anytime without penalty. Some students completed the surveys in person, on paper, 
follow a class meeting. Other students completed the surveys online, outside of a class setting. 
Depending upon their major, some students received psychology experimental participation 
credit for their efforts, while other students (i.e., non-psychology students) did not. Overall, 
participations from one cohort (i.e., those who received psychology participation credit) did not 
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know that participations from a different cohort (i.e., students from a different major, who did 
not need psychology participation credit) were involved. Also, no significant differences were 
found between participants who replied in person, participants who replied online, or participants 
who received participation credit. 
Analysis 
Data was not used for participants who failed to respond to all questions in a given 
analysis. Consequently, N ranges between 606 and 619 for the following analyses. First, the 
reliability of each, individual measure was analyzed. For the TAS and HSP the results (α = .89 
for the TAS, and α = .88 for the HSP) were equivalent those reported by other researchers. The 
internal reliability of the select ESS questions was α = .64. Next, the total reliability of all items 
combined was evaluated. Cronbach’s alpha for the total pool of items was very high (α = .93).  
Next, a (rotated) Varimax factor analysis with Kaiser Normalization was applied, in order 
to divide the items into empirically-derived sub-constructs. Although both Mehrabian and the 
Aron’s scales are considered unidimensional, this analysis yielded two orthogonal factors. The 
first accounted for 18.06% of the variance, and the second accounted for 6.73%. See Table 6 for 
the individual item loadings.  
The highest loading items for the first factor are TAS questions 21, 13, and 10. These 
items are each concerned with emotionality (e.g., “I am emotionally low key” or “I have 
continued, intense feelings”). The internal consistency of the 17 items that comprise this factor is 
.88. The highest loading items for the second factor are HSP questions 7, 25, and 9. These 
questions deal with immediate responses to sudden sensory stimuli (e.g., “Are you made 
uncomfortable by loud noises” or “Are you easily overwhelmed by things like bright lights”). 
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The internal consistency of the 18 items that comprise this factor is .88. Finally, the alpha for the 
new, 35-item composite scale is .91. 
If the overall data are reanalyzed using these factors, the following normative values 
emerge. For factor 1 (negative emotionality), the possible range of scores fell between -68 to 
+68. The mean in this dataset occurred at 12.3 with a standard deviation of 20.2. For factor 2 
(sensory sensitivity), the possible range of scores fell between 0 and +126. The mean in this 
dataset occurred at 67.8 with a standard deviation of 16.9. 
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Table 6: Rotated Component Matrix: Factor Loadings* 
Trait Arousability Scale  
(Mehrabian, 1995) 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Item 1 .167 -.040 
Item 2 .386 .131 
Item 3 -.049 .133 
Item 4 .195 .147 
Item 5 .169 .118 
Item 6 .427 .066 
Item 7 .095 .078 
Item 8 .096 .068 
Item 9 .601 .021 
Item 10 .768 .004 
Item 11 -.007 .138 
Item 12 .002 .072 
Item 13 .770 .086 
Item 14 .669 .117 
Item 15 .028 .071 
Item 16 .372 .204 
Item 17 .269 -.052 
Item 18 .379 .006 
Item 19 .622 .002 
Item 20 .069 .118 
Item 21 .711 .079 
Item 22 .275 .085 
Item 23 -.002 -.052 
Item 24 .195 .107 
Item 25 .276 .111 
Item 26 .138 .199 
Item 27 .140 .179 
Item 28 .468 .035 
Item 29 .657 -.081 
Item 30 .375 .065 
Item 31 .216 .016 
Item 32 .296 .063 
Item 33 -.007 .052 
Item 34 .525 .002 
 
Highly Sensitive Person scale  
(Aron & Aron, 1997) 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Item 1 .033 .355 
Item 2 -.120 .014 
Item 3 .148 .250 
Item 4 .126 .182 
Item 5 -.021 .405 
Item 6 .061 .413 
Item 7 .018 .644 
Item 8 -.016 .182 
Item 9 .086 .763 
Item 10 .129 .059 
Item 11 .024 .464 
Item 12 .089 .074 
Item 13 .194 .370 
Item 14 .230 .254 
Item 15 .077 -.028 
Item 16 .051 .244 
Item 17 .120 .054 
Item 18 .075 .277 
Item 19 .103 .541 
Item 20 .139 .254 
Item 21 .241 .330 
Item 22 .108 .025 
Item 23 .056 .365 
Item 24 -.045 .167 
Item 25 .073 .729 
Item 26 .085 .418 
Item 27 -.062 .330 
 
 
Environmental Sensory Stimuli Scale 
(Satow, 1987) 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Item 1 .008 .044 
Item 2 -.037 -.102 
Item 3 .016 .412 
Item 4 -.035 .164 
Item 5 .140 .154 
Item 6 -.023 .120 
Item 7 -.031 .089 
Item 8 -.033 .207 
Item 9 .039 .219 
Item 10 -.104 .133 
 
* Items scoring above .25 were included in each factor. 
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Discussion 
In this analysis, the TAS (Mehrabian, 1995), HSP (Aron & Aron, 1997), and a portion of 
the ESS (Satow, 1987) were compared and combined. Together these scales showed an 
exceptionally high internal consistency measure (α = .91), and when the items were factor 
analyzed, two subscales resulted: negative emotionality and orienting sensitivity.  
The first factor, negative emotionality, is defined by a propensity to experience negative 
emotions such as fear, sadness, frustration, and sensory discomfort (i.e., unpleasant affect 
resulting from sensory stimulation, such as pain or irritation). The second factor is defined by an 
increased orienting sensitivity; that is, a person’s threshold for perceptual stimuli. These two 
subscales were originally proposed by Evans and Rothbart (2008; Derryberry & Rothbart, 1988; 
Evans & Rothbart, 2007); although, Smolewska et al. (2006) first suggested that the HSP 
(specifically) may be comprised of multiple factors.  
In 2006, Smolewska, McCabe, and Woody analyzed the HSP. Even though it (and the 
TAS) are supposedly unidimensional measures, Smolewska et al. extracted three factors, which 
they labeled excitation, aesthetic sensitivity, and low-sensory threshold. Later, Evans and 
Rothbart (2008) renamed the factors negative affect, orienting sensitivity, and distress to over-
stimulation, respectively.  
Evans and Rothbart (2008) then conducted their own analysis of the Arons’ apparatus. In 
their discussion, they complained that the HSP items were not written to fit with precise 
definitions of sensory discomfort or negative emotionality. Nonetheless, they “roughly” (p. 110) 
sorted the items into categories. Through factor analysis and comparison to the Adult 
Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ; Evans & Rothbart, 2007), they were able to narrow the HSP 
into two factors: propensity for negative affect and orienting sensitivity. However, Evans and 
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Rothbart (2008) were dissatisfied with the scarcity of items that fit with the sensory sensitivity 
subscale, saying: “According to our conception of sensory sensitivity, there is only a single 
sensory sensitivity item in the HSP” (p. 117).  
In contrast, this analysis leveraged the TAS, HSP, and a portion of the ESS. Thus, it was 
able to overcome the dearth of adequate measures associated with each factor—the problem 
Evans and Rothbart identified with the HSP, alone. 
This analysis further diverges from Evans and Rothbart’s conceptualization of the 
underlying constructs of the two subscales. Specifically, Evans and Rothbart theorized that the 
negative emotionality and orienting sensitivity constructs were only modestly correlated, because 
the two “roughly” constructed subscales, which they devised from the HSP, correlated at r = .25. 
This led Evans and Rothbart to conclude that there is no support “for Aron and Aron’s (1997) 
contention that self-reported sensitivity and susceptibility to sensory discomfort were strongly 
related constructs” (p. 116).  
In spite of Evans and Rothbart’s claim, it does appear that psychometric and theoretical 
evidence (the former, from this study) support the notion that negative affect and orienting 
sensitivity are related. First, in this study, the subscales were highly correlated (r = .88). 
However, it was necessary to combine three apparatus in order to adequately resolve the two 
factors and achieve this correlation. Second, trait arousability is theorized to be an individual 
difference rooted in physiological differences (i.e., in the brain and central nervous system). 
Thus, the argument is that while individuals’ scores on the second subscale (orienting response) 
are unlikely to change, people can learn coping strategies to mitigate their tendency to 
experience negative emotions (i.e., the first subscale). Thus, the two subscale may be 
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theoretically associated without yielding identical scores. Obviously, more evidence is needed to 
support (or refute) this hypothesis.  
Nonetheless, this study (as well as Evans, Rothbart, and Smolewska et al.’s work) show 
that trait arousability is an established individual difference, even if researchers lack full 
agreement of its associated constructs and measures. Identifying trait arousability through self-
report survey can be difficult; yet, by combining three measures of trait arousability, the two 
subscales associated with the phenomenon become more clear. Thus, with this new, more robust, 
composite scale the two factors are now better measured, and their underlying constructs appear 
correlated.  
Summary and Response to Hypothesis 1 
Hypothesis 1 stated that “by factor analyzing existing measures of arousability a more 
reliable, more valid apparatus can be created. This apparatus will also help clarify the factor 
structure of arousability, which will make it more suitable for use in applied training systems.” 
This hypothesis was supported. A composite measure was successfully developed by comparing 
and combining existing apparatus. This new measure includes two unambiguous, theoretically-
valid factors, and its reliability is outstanding (α = .91).  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: AROUSABILITY TRAINING EXPERIMENT (STUDY 2) 
 
The purpose of this study was to address Hypothesis 2, which suggested that individual 
differences in arousability correlate with trainees’ depth of processing and consequently their 
success in training. In addition to addressing Hypothesis 2, this investigation also served as a 
validation of the apparatus that resulted from the first study. 
 Method 
Forty-five participants (N = 45; male = 33; female = 12; ages = 18–57) completed this 
study. They were recruited from University of Central Florida graduate and undergraduate 
classes and by word-of-mouth outside of the university. Most of the graduate and undergraduate 
students received extra credit in Digital Media or Psychology classes for their participation; 
except for the extra credit no other incentives were offered to any participants.  
Materials 
The data-collection materials used in this study include the following: the informed 
consent document (Appendix B), a standard biographical survey (Appendix C), the arousability 
survey developed in Study 1, the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults (Spielberger, 1983), a 
verbatim knowledge pre-test/post-test questionnaire (Appendix D), a semantic knowledge pre-
test/post-test questionnaire (Appendix E), the NASA-Task Load Index (NASA-TLX; Appendix 
G), and TPL-KATS Concept Map software (Hoeft et al., 2003). Most materials were presented in 
paper-and-pencil format; however, the semantic knowledge questionnaires, NASA-TLX, and 
concept maps were delivered via a computer.  
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The other apparatus used in this study was a five-minute multimedia (i.e., animated visual 
imagery and audio narration) computer-based presentation about US Marine Fire Support Teams 
(FiST), including one specific FiST task called a Call for Fire (CFF). Screen-captures of this 
presentation are available in Appendix H. The presentation was manipulated for the experimental 
conditions as follows.  
In Condition 1 (the control condition) participants witnessed/heard the standard 
presentation. In Condition 2 (the slight-arousal condition) the standard presentation was coupled 
with a (redundant) textual representation of the narration, as well as a constant white noise. The 
audio narration ranged between 84.0–90.1 dB (relatively), and the volume of the white noise 
track was 84.5 dB (relatively). If participants adjusted the narration volume, the white noise 
volume changed correspondingly. Effectively, participants could clearly hear the narration, and 
yet the white noise was also clearly audible. Colloquially, it could be said that the narration 
sounded as if it has been recorded along with considerable static. Both the white noise and the 
redundant textual/audio narration have been shown to increase general arousal in previous 
investigations (e.g., white noise: Hockey (1986b); Brocke, Tasche & Beauducel (1997); Coren & 
Mah (1993); Davidson & Smith (1991); e.g., redundant text: Sweller (1999); Mayer (2002)). 
A third condition was added after initial results indicated that Condition 2 was not 
sufficiently arousing. In Condition 3 (the moderate-arousal condition) the standard presentation 
was coupled with randomly-timed white-noise and visual-static bursts, which occurred at least 
once every 20 seconds. The redundant text narration was removed since it failed to significantly 
affect arousal. Again, the audio narration ranged between 84.0–90.1 dB (relatively). The white 
noise bursts were 100 dB (relatively) and lasted about half a second. 
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Procedure 
This study required approximately 75 minutes to complete. When participants arrived, 
they were briefed on study requirements and then asked to review and sign the informed consent 
document (Appendix B). They then completed the following, in this order:  
1. A standard biographical survey (Appendix C) 
2. The arousability survey developed in Study 1 
3. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults (Spielberger, 1983) 
4. A verbatim knowledge pre-test questionnaire (Appendix D) 
Participants set their own pace for completing these initial surveys. Following their 
completion, the experimenter asked participants to move to a nearby laptop computer station. 
Using a standard word-processing program, participants responded to several essay questions:  
5. Five semantic knowledge essay questions – pre-test (Appendix E) 
Before beginning the essay questions, participants were informed that spelling and 
grammar would not be “graded” and also asked to report their confidence in the accuracy of each 
of their answers. They were given a maximum of 10 minutes to respond to the essay questions. 
Following this, participants were instructed to watch the five-minute multimedia presentation 
(see Appendix H for screen captures). The multimedia trainer was presented on the laptop and 
used QuietComfort noise-cancelling headphones to deliver the audio. Participants were able to 
adjust the master volume to suit their preference. Immediately after the multimedia presentation 
concluded the following questionnaires were administered, in this order:  
6. The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory for Adults – form Y1 (state anxiety) 
7. The NASA-TLX (Appendix G) 
8. A verbatim knowledge post-test questionnaire (Appendix D) 
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9. Five semantic knowledge essay questions – post-test (Appendix E) 
Finally, participants were asked to create concept maps depicting their mental models of 
the subject matter (i.e., USMC Fire Support Teams and their supporting units). TPL-KATS 
Concept Map software facilitated this step: 
10. TPL-KATS Concept Map (Hoeft et al., 2003; Appendix F) 
Before participants created their subject-matter concept maps, they were first given 
instructions on using the TPL-KATS system. Next, participants each created a basic, practice 
concept map about a typical classroom; at this point, they were able to ask the experimenter 
questions about the concept map process and/or the TPL-KATS software. Once participants 
completed the practice concept map, they were then instructed to complete the subject-matter 
concept map. The expert version of this map is shown in Appendix F. Participants were given an 
unlimited amount of time to complete their concept map, and when they concluded they were 
debriefed about the study (see the debriefing sheet in Appendix I). 
Results 
The a priori hypotheses developed for this study predicted complex interactions among 
several variables (i.e., the arousability factors, experimental condition, and several outcome 
measures). Moderated multiple regression (MMR) is the most appropriate analysis approach for 
this type of model. Unfortunately, several statistical biases are associated with MMR, including 
multicollinearity, low residual variance of the product term in the regression equation, residual 
variance heterogeneity, and multivariate normality (Kromrey & Foster-Johnson, 1998). To better 
control for these issues, data transformation procedures are typically applied before analysis 
begins. 
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Data Preprocessing 
First, data were transformed using mean centering (also known as “mean deviation”). 
Mean centering is one of the most commonly employed data transformations, particularly in the 
social sciences. It is applied by subtracting the dataset’s overall mean from each item within that 
set (for a more detailed discussion of this, see Kreft, Leeuw, & Aiken, 1994). Some statisticians 
suggest mean centering protects against multicollinearity (e.g., Aiken & West 1991; Jaccard et 
al. (1990); Cronbach, 1987) and improves the interpretability of data (e.g., Boysworth & Booksh, 
2001; Finney et al, 1984). Other methodologists contend that mean centering offers no benefit 
over using raw scores (e.g., Echambadi & Hess, 2007; Kromrey & Foster-Johnson, 1998); for 
instance, Kromrey and Foster-Johnson claim that “the arguments about the benefits of centering 
are specious and serve only to distract researchers from the multitude of pertinent issues in the 
conduct of inquiry” (p. 44). Finally, other analysts take a middle ground, admitting that mean-
centering may or may not be statistically meaningful, but that there are some cases where 
centering may at least facilitate interpretation. For instance, Kreft et al. (1994) conclude that 
“since scales in psychology are in the main arbitrary, rescaling predictors to approximately equal 
locations and variances prior to analysis is often both possible and desirable” (p. 12). Thus, 
taking these arguments into consideration, the arousability factors (discussed later in this 
chapter) were transformed using a traditional mean centering approach in order to aid 
interpretability and possibly (depending upon which argument is believed) help mitigate 
multicollinearity.  
Next, dummy variables were used to represent the three experimental conditions. Dummy 
variables are useful for comparing the slopes associated with datasets from various groups 
(Aguinis, 2004). In this case, the control condition was given the dummy value of 0, the second 
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and third conditions were each given dummy values of 1. Following this, each dummy variable 
was then multiplied against each arousability factor score (i.e., the mean-centered score) for each 
participant. This resulted in a new variable that simultaneously captured the condition and 
arousability scores. These scores were used later, in the regression analysis. 
NASA TLX Scoring 
The NASA TLX divides subjective workload into mental demand, physical demand, 
temporal demand, performance, effort, and frustration level. The NASA TLX also includes a 
weighting scheme, in order to account for individual differences regarding how different 
workload aspects are subjectively experienced. However, contemporary research suggests that 
weighted TLX scores provide no additional predictive power compared to non-weighted scores 
(Tsang & Wilson, 1997; Nygren, 1991; Christ et al., 1993; Hendy et al., 1993). Consequently, 
weighted scores were not used in this analysis; only raw scores were analyzed. 
Normality of Data 
The arousability data satisfy the assumptions of normality. The cells have equal n-sizes, 
demonstrate homogeneity of variance, and display normal distributions. For the orienting 
sensitivity arousability factor the skewness = 1.5 and the kurtosis = .98. For the negative 
emotionality arousability factor the skewness = .18 and the kurtosis = .01. These values verify 
that both factors are neither significantly skewed nor significantly kurtotic. Tables 7 and 8 
contain more detailed information, and Figure 3 shows the distribution of the raw arousability 
factor scores. 
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Figure 3. The distribution of participants’ raw arousability scores, separated by factor. These 
distributions represent all participants in the control and most-stimulating conditions (i.e., 
Conditions 1 and 3).   
 
Data Analyses 
Once data were preprocessed, they were next analyzed. Since the initial experimental 
condition (Condition 2) failed to sufficiently affect individuals’ general arousal, it is not included 
in the following analyses. Instead, the remainder of the discussion will focus on comparing the 
control (Condition 1) and more intense, second experimental (Condition 3) groups. Main effects 
for these two conditions (i.e., ignoring arousability scores) are shown in Table 7. As these data 
suggest no significant differences between the groups existed before the manipulation, but 
logical differences manifested after the manipulation. More specifically, individuals in the 
experimental condition reported slightly greater state anxiety and mental workload. These 
individuals also performed poorer on the more difficult section (i.e., part two) of the verbatim 
knowledge questionnaire and reported lower confidence in their essay question responses.  
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Next, the same descriptive statistics and mean comparisons were conducted based upon 
high- and low-arousability scores (i.e., ignoring condition). First, grand median values were 
calculated for both arousability factors (orienting sensitivity median = 58.5; negative 
emotionality median = 6.5). This approach ensured that each group contained an n = 15. 
Individuals with higher arousability were distributed evenly between conditions; for both factors 
7 participants from the control condition were above the median. This grouping procedure was 
performed in order to gain additional statistical power.   
The main effects for arousability (i.e., ignoring condition) are found in Table 8. As theory 
suggests, individuals scoring above the median value of arousability also reported significantly 
higher trait anxiety scores, although not significantly greater pre-training state anxiety scores. 
More sensitive individuals also reported greater state anxiety after the training—regardless of 
whether they experienced the control or experimental training—and they reported greater mental 
effort expenditure, again regardless of condition. Finally, the more arousable group also scored 
lower on the more challenging portion of the verbatim knowledge questionnaire (i.e., part two) 
but, unexpectedly, scored much better on the post-test semantic questions. These scores are 
shown in Table 8.  
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Table 7: Main Effects for Condition (Ignoring Arousability) 
  Control (n = 15) Experimental (n = 15) P 
Pr
e-
te
st
s 
Sex Males = 10 Males = 11  
STAI – Trait Anxiety Mean = 33.3; SD = 15.2 Mean = 38.8; SD = 8.5 n.s. 
STAI – State Anxiety Mean = 44.3; SD = 13.0 Mean = 47.4; SD = 7.5 n.s. 
Arousability – orienting sensitivity Mean = 62.2; SD = 23.1 Mean = 56.8; SD = 11.1 n.s. 
Arousability – negative emotionality Mean = 1.67; SD = 19.6 Mean = 9.87; SD = 16.9 n.s. 
Verbatim knowledge (part 1) Mean = 10.2; SD = 4.0 Mean = 10.8; SD = 2.8 n.s. 
Verbatim knowledge (part 2) Mean = 8.0; SD = 2.4 Mean = 7.0; SD =2.6 n.s. 
Semantic knowledge Mean = 1.47; SD = 1.1 Mean = 1.40; SD = 1.4 n.s. 
Semantic answer confidence Mean = 2.7; SD = 8.8 Mean = 1.5; SD = 7.1 n.s. 
Po
st
-te
st
s 
STAI – State Anxiety (post-test) Mean = 34.4; SD = 13.1 Mean = 42.4; SD = 9.0 .031** 
TLX – Mental Workload Mean = 62.0; SD = 21.9 Mean = 70.3; SD = 14.1 n.s. 
TLX – Physical Workload Mean = 23.0; SD = 15.1 Mean = 25.3; SD = 15.8 n.s. 
TLX – Temporal Workload Mean = 50.3; SD = 17.9 Mean = 54.3; SD = 19.5 n.s. 
TLX – Performance Mean = 41.3; SD = 22.1 Mean = 54.3; SD = 19.5 .044* 
TLX – Effort Mean = 66.0; SD = 21.6 Mean = 69.0; SD = 15.6 n.s. 
TLX – Frustration Mean = 40.3; SD = 25.0 Mean = 52.3; SD = 25.0 n.s. 
TLX – Total Mean = 51.6; SD = 17.6 Mean = 62.3; SD = 11.7 .031* 
Verbatim knowledge (part 1) Mean = 18.0; SD = 3.0 Mean = 17.5; SD = 2.3 n.s. 
Verbatim knowledge (part 2) Mean = 9.7; SD = 2.8 Mean = 8.0; SD =2.4 .039* 
Semantic knowledge Mean = 2.07; SD = 2.0 Mean = 1.87; SD = 1.8 n.s. 
Semantic answer confidence Mean = 11.6; SD = 4.5 Mean = 6.7; SD = 6.2 .013* 
Concept map scores Mean = 13.0; SD = 4.5 Mean = 11.9; SD = 4.9 n.s. 
* p-values are one-tailed with equal variances assumed 
** p-values are one-tailed with equal variances not assumed 
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Table 8: Main Effects of “High” and “Low” Arousability Scores (Ignoring Condition) 
  Below Median (n = 15) 
“Low” Arousability 
Above Median (n = 15) 
“High” Arousability 
p 
A
ro
us
ab
ili
ty
 –
 o
rie
nt
in
g 
se
ns
iti
vi
ty
 
Sex Male = 11 Male = 10  
STAI – State Anxiety (pre-test) Mean = 32.3; SD = 9.8 Mean = 39.7; SD = 13.9 n.s. 
STAI – Trait Anxiety (pre-test) Mean = 41.6; SD = 9.5 Mean = 50.2; SD = 10.0 .011** 
STAI – State Anxiety (post-test) Mean = 32.9; SD = 11.2 Mean = 44.0; SD = 9.8 .004* 
TLX – Mental Workload Mean = 65.3; SD = 19.9 Mean = 67; SD = 17.1 n.s. 
TLX – Physical Workload Mean = 17.0; SD = 9.4 Mean = 31.3; SD = 16.7 .003* 
TLX – Temporal Workload Mean = 48.7; SD = 20.1 Mean = 56.0; SD = 15.8 n.s. 
TLX – Performance Mean = 51.0; SD = 22.9 Mean = 45.0; SD = 20.1 n.s. 
TLX – Effort Mean = 66.3; SD = 21.9 Mean = 74.7; SD = 11.3 .018* 
TLX – Frustration Mean = 39.7; SD = 27.5 Mean = 53.0; SD = 22.3 n.s. 
TLX – Total Mean = 53.9; SD = 18.8 Mean = 60.0; SD = 11.7 n.s. 
Verbatim (part 1) pre/post test difference Mean = 7.1; SD = 4.4 Mean = 7.4; SD = 2.7 n.s. 
Verbatim (part 2) pre/post test difference Mean = 2.13; SD = 2.9 Mean = .53; SD = 3.2 n.s. 
Semantic pre/post test difference Mean = -.27; SD = 1.5 Mean = 1.53; SD = 2.1  .011*** 
Semantic confidence pre/post test difference Mean = 6.6; SD = 8.0 Mean = 7.7; SD = 6.1 n.s. 
Concept map scores Mean = 12.7; SD = 5.8 Mean = 12.2; SD = 3.5 n.s. 
A
ro
us
ab
ili
ty
 –
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
em
ot
io
na
lit
y 
Sex Male = 13 Male = 8  
STAI – State Anxiety (pre-test) Mean = 32.5; SD = 9.8 Mean = 39.5; SD = 14.1 n.s. 
STAI – Trait Anxiety (pre-test) Mean = 41.6; SD = 9.6 Mean = 50.2; SD = 9.9 .011** 
STAI – State Anxiety (post-test) Mean = 34.2; SD = 11.2 Mean = 42.6; SD = 11.1 .024* 
TLX – Mental Workload Mean = 63.7; SD = 19.2 Mean = 68.7; SD = 17.5 n.s. 
TLX – Physical Workload Mean = 21.0; SD = 12.6 Mean = 27.3; SD = 17.3 n.s. 
TLX – Temporal Workload Mean = 48.3; SD = 21.3 Mean = 56.3; SD = 14.9 n.s. 
TLX – Performance Mean = 51.0; SD = 24.2 Mean = 45.0; SD = 18.4 n.s. 
TLX – Effort Mean = 61.3; SD = 21.3 Mean = 73.7; SD = 13.6 .034* 
TLX – Frustration Mean = 38.7; SD = 24.5 Mean = 54.0; SD = 24.9 .05* 
TLX – Total Mean = 52.4; SD = 18.1 Mean = 61.5; SD = 11.7 n.s. 
Verbatim (part 1) pre/post test difference Mean = 7.3; SD = 4.0 Mean = 7.2; SD = 3.1 n.s. 
Verbatim (part 2) pre/post test difference Mean = 2.3; SD = 3.1 Mean = .33; SD = 2.9 .040* 
Semantic pre/post test difference Mean = .07; SD = 1.8 Mean = 1.2; SD = 2.1 n.s. 
Semantic confidence pre/post test difference Mean = 6.7; SD = 6.9 Mean = 7.5; SD = 7.3 n.s. 
Concept map scores Mean = 12.7; SD = 6.0 Mean = 12.3; SD = 3.2 n.s. 
* p-values are one-tailed with equal variances assumed 
** p-values are one-tailed with equal variances not assumed 
*** p-value is two-tailed with equal variances assumed 
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Finally, after taking these main effects into consideration, an MMR was performed using 
the condition (control or experimental) and the condition-by-arousability interaction scores. The 
condition-by-arousability scores were calculated by multiplying the dummy variable by each of 
the mean-centered arousability factor values (as was discussed above). This effectively made the 
control group interaction scores a statistical baseline. The results of the regression algorithms are 
shown in Tables 9–21.  
STAI – State Anxiety (Post-test) 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 9a and 9b. 
However, for this dependent variable the R2 value is meaningful; its importance is discussed in 
the Discussion section. 
 
Table 9a: MMR Model, DV = STAI – State Anxiety (Post-test) 
Regression Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   480.0 1 480.0 3.8 .088 .061 
2 Inclusion of interactions 966.8 3 322.3 2.8 .154 .063 
 
Table 9b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = STAI – State Anxiety (Post-test) 
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 34.4 2.8 .000 
Condition 7.7 4.2 .078 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity 5.9 4.8 .227 
Condition X Negative Emotionality .23 .18 .198 
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TLX – Mental Workload 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 10a and 10b.  
 
Table 10a: MMR Model, DV = TLX – Mental Workload 
Regression Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   520.8 1 520.8 1.60 .20 .216 
2 Inclusion of interactions 712.5 3 237.5 .692 -.033 .565 
 
Table 10b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = TLX – Mental Workload  
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 62.0 4.8 .000 
Condition 7.2 .278 .178 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity 8.2 .141 .482 
Condition X Negative Emotionality .299 -.073 .716 
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TLX – Physical Workload 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 11a and 11b.  
 
Table 11a: MMR Model, DV = TLX – Physical Workload 
Regression Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   40.8 1 40.8 .172 -.029 .682 
2 Inclusion of interactions 941.3 3 313.8 1.416 .041 .261 
 
Table 11b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = TLX – Physical Workload  
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 23.0 3.8 .000 
Condition 4.2 5.7 .472 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity 12.7 6.6 .066 
Condition X Negative Emotionality .047 .24 .848 
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TLX – Temporal Workload 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 12a and 12b. 
Once again, the R2 values suggest that additional information might be gleaned from this model; 
see the Discussion for greater detail. 
 
Table 12a: MMR Model, DV = TLX – Temporal Workload 
Regression Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   120.0 1 120.0 .342 -.023 .563 
2 Inclusion of interactions 2068.9 3 689.6 2.28 .117 .103 
 
Table 12b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = TLX – Temporal Workload  
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 50.3 4.5 .000 
Condition 8.0 6.7 .247 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity 19.6 7.7 .018 
Condition X Negative Emotionality -.12 .28 .672 
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TLX – Performance 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 13a and 13b.  
 
Table 13a: MMR Model, DV = TLX – Performance 
Regression Model Sum of Squares dF Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   1333.3 1 1333.3 3.1 .069 .087 
2 Inclusion of interactions 1351.4 3 450.5 .99 -.001 .415 
 
Table 13b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = TLX – Performance 
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 41.3 5.5 .000 
Condition 13.1 8.3 .125 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity -1.7 9.5 .860 
Condition X Negative Emotionality -.02 .35 .961 
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TLX – Effort 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 14a and 14b. 
The R2 values here are also somewhat higher than expected. 
 
Table 14a: MMR Model, DV = TLX – Effort 
Regression Model Sum of Squares dF Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   67.5 1 67.5 .190 -.029 .667 
2 Inclusion of interactions 1805.7 3 601.9 1.9 .085 .154 
 
Table 14b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = TLX – Effort 
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 66.0 4.6 .000 
Condition 3.5 6.9 .615 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity 13.9 7.9 .089 
Condition X Negative Emotionality .33 .29 .268 
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TLX – Frustration 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 15a and 15b. 
Again, note the high R2 values, and the see the Discussion for more detail. 
 
Table 15a: MMR Model, DV = TLX – Frustration 
Regression Model Sum of Squares dF Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   1080.0 1 1080.0 1.7 .024 .203 
2 Inclusion of interactions 4566.7 3 1522.2 2.8 .155 .062 
 
Table 15b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = TLX – Frustration 
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 40.3 6.1 .000 
Condition 12.2 9.1 .192 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity 18.4 10.4 .088 
Condition X Negative Emotionality .52 .38 .181 
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TLX Total 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 16a and 16b.  
 
Table 16a: MMR Model, DV = TLX Total 
Regression Model Sum of Squares dF Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   853.3 1 853.3 3.8 .088 .061 
2 Inclusion of interactions 1518.9 3 506.3 2.4 .123 .096 
 
Table 16b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = TLX Total 
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 51.6 3.8 .000 
Condition 11.5 5.7 .054 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity 9.6 6.5 .152 
Condition X Negative Emotionality .147 .237 .540 
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Verbatim Knowledge (part 1) Post-Test 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 17a and 17b. 
 
Table 17a: MMR Model, DV = Verbatim Knowledge (part 1) Post-Test 
Regression Model Sum of Squares dF Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   2.1 1 2.1 .30 -.025 .589 
2 Inclusion of interactions 8.9 3 3.0 .40 -.066 .756 
 
Table 17b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = Verbatim Knowledge (part 1) Post-Test 
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 18.0 .70 .000 
Condition -.22 1.1 .835 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity 1.1 1.2 .382 
Condition X Negative Emotionality -.02 .04 .609 
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Verbatim Knowledge (part 2) Post-Test 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 18a and 18b. 
 
Table 18a: MMR Model, DV = Verbatim Knowledge (part 2) Post-Test 
Regression Model Sum of Squares df Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   22.5 1 22.5 3.4 .075 .078 
2 Inclusion of interactions 28.5 3 9.5 1.4 .035 .279 
 
Table 18b: MMR Model-2 Components, Verbatim Knowledge (part 2) Post-Test 
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 9.7 .68 .000 
Condition -1.5 1.0 .167 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity .31 1.2 .794 
Condition X Negative Emotionality -.04 .04 .367 
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Semantic Knowledge Post-Test 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 19a and 19b. 
 
Table 19a: MMR Model, DV = Semantic Knowledge Post-Test 
Regression Model Sum of Squares dF Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   .30 1 .30 .08 -.033 .779 
2 Inclusion of interactions 6.9 3 2.3 .61 -.042 .614 
 
Table 19b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = Semantic Knowledge Post-Test 
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 2.1 .50 .000 
Condition -.12 .75 .870 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity .95 .86 .279 
Condition X Negative Emotionality .02 .03 .637 
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Semantic Post-Test Answer Confidence 
The results suggest that the model effectively predicted individuals’ confidence in their 
semantic knowledge responses; however, the condition-by-arousability interaction did not 
significantly add predictive value beyond the condition component. Specific results of this 
analysis are depicted in Tables 20a and 20b. 
 
Table 20a: MMR Model, DV = Semantic Post-Test Answer Confidence 
Regression Model Sum of Squares dF Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   163.3 1 163.3 5.6 .136 .026 
2 Inclusion of interactions 246.7 3 82.2 2.9 .164 .054 
 
Table 20b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = Semantic Post-Test Answer Confidence 
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 11.5 1.4 .000 
Condition -4.9 2.1 .025 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity -3.3 2.4 .171 
Condition X Negative Emotionality -.06 .09 .517 
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Concept map scores 
The results suggest that neither the overall model, nor the moderator variables, have 
significant predictive value. Specific results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 21a and 21b. 
 
Table 21a: MMR Model, DV = TLX – Concept Maps 
Regression Model Sum of Squares dF Mean Square F R2 Adjusted p 
1 Condition-only   8.5 1 8.5 .37 -.022 .546 
2 Inclusion of interactions 91.4 3 30.5 1.4 .042 .258 
 
Table 21b: MMR Model-2 Components, DV = TLX – Concept Maps 
 B 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) 
Std. Error 
(Unstandardized Coefficient) p 
(Constant) 13.0 1.2 .000 
Condition .00 1.8 .999 
Condition X Orienting Sensitivity 3.8 2.1 .072 
Condition X Negative Emotionality -.07 .08 .331 
 
Discussion 
In this study, main effects for both condition and arousability were uncovered. Not 
surprisingly, participants in the arousing condition (i.e., those subjected to randomly timed 
white-noise and visual-static bursts) reportedly experienced higher state anxiety and mental 
workload during the training. They also performed somewhat poorer on the more difficult 
portion of the verbatim knowledge questionnaire (i.e., part 2) and reported less confidence in 
their essay question responses.  
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Arousability also influenced several main effects in theoretically-predictable ways. For 
this study, the arousability construct was broken into two factors: orienting sensitivity and 
negative emotionality. These factors were theoretically proposed by Evans, Rothbart, and 
Smolewska et al.’s work and were confirmed in Study 1. Orienting sensitivity refers to a 
person’s nervous-system sensitivity to stimuli. Negative emotionality refers to individuals’ 
cognitive/emotional responses to the processing of those stimuli (see Chapter 6 for additional 
detail). In this experiment, individuals with higher orienting sensitivity reported significantly 
greater trait anxiety and post-test state anxiety, as well as increased mental workload during the 
training. Quite surprisingly, individuals with higher orienting sensitivity performed much better 
on the semantic knowledge essay questions than did their less arousable counterparts (this 
unexpected finding is discussed in greater detail below). Individuals with greater negative 
emotionality also reported significantly higher mental workload during the training, and they 
performed poorer then their less-arousable peers on the more difficult portion of the verbatim 
knowledge questionnaire (i.e., part 2). 
The hypothesized interaction effects for condition-by-arousability were not found. None 
of the regression models that used condition and arousability were significantly predictive. Thus, 
the results fail to support the hypothesis (originally presented in Chapter 5):  
Hypothesis 2: Highly-arousable individuals will demonstrate poorer semantic 
understanding of (highly-arousing) multimedia-based training, as compared to 
less-arousable individuals. However, all participants will likely show equal 
verbatim understanding of the training.  
 
In fact from the overall analyses, it appears that participants’ verbatim understanding was 
influenced by main effects but not by the interaction of condition-by-arousability. Further, it 
appears that all hypersensitives performed better than their hyposensitive counterparts—
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regardless of condition—on the semantic knowledge questionnaires. These results are explored 
and hypotheses for their causes are given below. 
Statistical Bias and Error 
Clearly, the influence of arousability was not sufficiently robust, relative to error, in this 
study. However, what remains unclear is whether the nonsignificant results definitively support 
the Null Hypothesis or whether they are better attributed to other issues. Certainly, both low 
statistical power and sampling bias (discussed below) affected the results. The statistical 
complication created by having only 15 participants per group is obvious: Low statistical power 
increases the likelihood of making a Type II error (that is, of making a false negative).  
The second statistical complication is initially less obvious, and its true impact can only 
be surmised. When the study was originally conceived, the arousing manipulation in the 
experimental condition was very mild. This manipulation proved ineffective at producing general 
arousal; therefore, an additional condition was added. This third condition was added at the end 
of the study, and consequently, all participants in that condition were run consecutively. This 
created an unexpected sampling bias: Low-arousability individuals in the second experimental 
condition were significantly more anxious before the experiment began compared to the low-
arousability participants in the control condition. Since the STAI was used to determine 
individuals’ states, these data can be interpreted to mean that the lower-arousability participants 
in the experimental condition were already experiencing high arousal states before the 
experiment even began. See Table 22 for specific details on this data and Figure 4 for a more 
interpretable graph of these data. 
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Table 22: Pre-test STAI – State Anxiety Scores, Separated by Condition and Arousability  
  STAI – State Anxiety 
(pre-test) 
STAI – Trait Anxiety 
(pre-test) 
  Mean Median SD Mean Median SD 
C
on
tr
ol
 
Orienting 
Sensitivity 
Lower (below median) 23.3 26.0 4.7 38.9 38.5 8.9 
Higher (above median) 41.3 30.0 19.3 50.6 50.0 14.7 
Negative 
Emotionality 
Lower (below median) 28.1 38.5 9.4 26.0 36.0 9.2 
Higher (above median) 39.1 30.0 19.0 51.0 48.0 14.0 
Ex
pe
ri
m
en
ta
l Orienting 
Sensitivity 
Lower (below median) 39.3 42.0 9.7 44.6 46.0 9.8 
Higher (above median) 38.4 37.0 7.9 49.9 50.0 3.8 
Negative 
Emotionality 
Lower (below median) 37.6 42.0 8.0 45.1 49.0 9.4 
Higher (above median) 39.9 37.0 9.3 49.5 48.5 5.0 
 
 
Figure 4. Mean STAI (pre-test) scores of lower-arousability participants, separated by the 
control and experimental conditions. 
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Although it is unclear why this sampling bias exists, it is logical to believe that the bias 
impacted the results found in the regression analyses. A pair-wise comparison between pre- and 
post-test STAI state anxiety scores demonstrates the impact of the sampling bias very clearly 
(see Figure 5). In the control condition, high-arousability individuals showed greater state 
anxiety than low-arousability participants (as expected), and all participants’ STAI state anxiety 
scores following the (control) training were approximately equivalent to their initial STAI 
scores. This shows that neither group found the training to be particularly arousing (as expected). 
In the experimental condition, high-arousability individuals did not show meaningfully greater 
initial state anxiety as compared with low-arousability participants, and in fact, all participants in 
the experimental condition reported initial (pre-test) state anxiety equivalent to the high-
arousability participants in the control condition (this is the sampling bias). Despite this bias, the 
high-arousability participants did react more negatively to the experimental (i.e., arousing) 
training than did the low-arousability participants (see Figure 5). This post-test difference in 
reaction is expected, based upon theory; however, the odd pre-test state and trait anxiety results 
are not readily explainable.   
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Figure 5. Pre- and post-test STAI state anxiety scores, separated by condition and arousability. 
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Essay Question Results 
For this study, the a priori hypothesis suggested that highly-arousable individuals would  
perform more poorly on semantic questions following the arousing training. In fact, significant 
results support the opposite. That is, hypersensitives in the experimental condition actually 
performed better on the essay questions than did their hyposensitive counterparts. Figure 6 
demonstrates this phenomenon.  
 
 
Figure 6. Mean pre- and post-test semantic knowledge essay question scores separated by and 
arousability for participants in the experimental condition only. 
 
 
Similar results were uncovered in the control condition (see Figure 7). Together, these 
finding demonstrate that arousable individuals performed better on this study’s essay questions, 
regardless of whether the participants were exposed to white noise bursts during training or not. 
These results were not predicted. They might be explained by reexamining some of the known 
correlations with hypersensitivity; that is, highly-arousable individuals are known to demonstrate 
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greater imaginative ability (see Chapter 3 for more detail). Perhaps the essay questions tapped 
into participants’ creativity more so (or instead of) their deeper processing abilities. More 
investigation into this may be warranted.  
 
 
Figure 7. Mean pre- and post-test semantic knowledge essay question scores separated by and 
arousability for participants in the control condition only. 
 
R2 Values 
The amount of variance accounted for by a regression model is captured in the R2 
statistic. Adjusted R2 is a more conservative R2 estimate. It adjusts the R2 value to give a more 
realistic measure when the model includes multiple factors. In the above regression analyses, 
high Adjusted R2 values were associated with several models, including temporal workload, 
effortful workload, and frustration. In each of these cases, the interaction of arousability-by-
condition contributed meaningful variance to the regression algorithm, beyond the variance 
captured by including the only condition factor.  
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For temporal workload, the interactions of arousability-by-condition accounted for about 
9.4% of the variance beyond the predictive power of using condition alone; in this case, the 
relevant interaction was orienting sensitivity-by-condition. For effortful workload, the interaction 
accounted for about 5.6% of the variance beyond condition alone, and again orienting 
sensitivity-by-condition represented the most meaningful interaction. For frustration, the 
orienting sensitivity-by-condition interaction accounted for 13.1% of the variance beyond using 
condition alone.  
In each of these cases, the regression models failed to achieve p = .05 statistical 
significance; however, the results approach significance. That, combined with these meaningful 
Adjusted R2 values suggest that further investigation may be justified. More specifically, 
additional research may uncover meaningful interaction effects between over-stimulation and 
high orienting sensitivity that affects individuals’ mental workload. Since mental workload 
capacity plays an integral role in training, these potential interaction effects may be relevant to 
future training systems. 
Implications for Arousability and Training 
Does Arousability Meaningfully Affect Training? 
This study, and the overall paper, are ultimately concerned with improving adaptive 
training by using data beyond traditional performance measures to inform systems. Specifically, 
these data include information about trainees’ individual differences. Trait arousability was 
theorized to be a relevant and potentially useful variable to consider. The results from this study 
fail to support that hypothesis. However, some conclusions can be drawn, and speculations can 
be made about the meaning of the results. 
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First, arousability does not appear to meaningfully moderate learning performance, at 
least if the arousal inherent to the training is moderate (like in this study). One hypothesis is that 
hypersensitive individuals are able to cope with moderate over-stimulation during training. 
Assuming this is the case, it still remains unclear whether hypersensitives would be equally able 
to cope with greater amounts of arousal during training.  
A second hypothesis is that the arousal created by the experimental condition was merely 
enough to narrow participants’ attentional focus. Considerable research has already demonstrated 
that too much arousal leads to narrowing of focus and reduction in individuals’ attentional 
capacities. Typically, limited attention is considered detrimental to learning; however, if 
attention is limited so that only the training material is focused upon, then additional arousal may 
actually facilitate dominant information recall. (This was reviewed in Chapter 3.) This study 
attempted to account for this phenomenon by including measures of both verbatim information 
and deeper “semantic” surveys; however, using concurrent measures of attentional resources 
(such as a dual-task paradigm) may have better addressed this issue. 
Third, it is possible that the curvilinear (i.e., inverted–U) nature of the arousal–
performance relationship obscured meaningful differences in this study. If, for example, 
hyposensitive participants were slightly below their optimum arousal states while hypersensitive 
participants were slightly above their optimum states of arousal, then the two groups’ 
performance would still be equivalent—even though they both experienced nonoptimal states for 
different reasons. While it is statistically unlikely for this to occur, the data from the current 
study cannot refute the possibility. This speculation harkens back to Muse, Harris, & Field’s 
(2003) complaint about inverted–U opponents (see Chapter 3). Specifically, they argue that 
linear comparisons cannot disprove curvilinear models. Thus additional empirical study, 
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preferably using multiple levels of stimulation to facilitate a curvilinear regression analysis, are 
required to address this issue. 
Finally, even though arousability failed to meaningfully affect training outcomes directly 
(e.g., performance), trends in the results suggest that arousability may significantly affect 
moderators of training outcomes, specifically mental workload. The moderately-sized Adjusted 
R2 values and significant main effect results seem to support this notion. Certainly, additional, 
research directed at the workload–arousability relationship would be required to objectively 
support this theory. 
In summary, whether this study’s nonsignificant results were caused by statistical “noise” 
in the experimental design, by hypersensitives’ ability to cope with moderate stress during 
training, by hypersensitives accessing additional attentional resources, or because of the 
curvilinear nature of arousal and performance, one thing is clear: Real-world training situations 
are more uncertain than any experimental setting. If arousability is to be seriously considered as 
a meaningful variable for adaptive training systems, then the above issues must be completely 
addressed and the specific effects of arousability on training outcomes (or their moderators) must 
be better articulated.  
What Do These Results Mean for the Two-Factor Scale? 
One purpose of this investigation was to validate the conglomerate, two-factor 
arousability scale developed in Study 1. Again, the nonsignificant results found in the above 
analyses neither clearly support nor clearly reject the viability of the scale. By considering the 
significant main effects and near-significant trends in the regression algorithms, it seems 
probable that the scale’s two factors do measure related, but not identical, constructs (as was 
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hypothesized). Of the two factors, orienting sensitivity influenced more dependent variables in 
this study, which seems appropriate considering the nature of the arousing stimuli used (i.e., 
sensory stimuli with no inherent emotional valence).  
Overall, this study failed to validate—or invalidate—the two-factor scale. Additional 
research should be aimed at determining which dependent variables are most influenced by each 
factor, and the profiles of individuals who score highly on one factor, on the other factor, and on 
both. Finally, further validation testing is required before the conglomerate two-factor scale 
becomes an appropriate research tool.  
Implications for Arousability and Training: Conclusion 
In general, the nonsignificant interaction effects of this experiment lead to more questions 
than answers. The theory and complementary research conducted on arousability suggest that it 
impacts training, and interaction effects between stimulation level and arousability should be 
theoretically expected. However, these results suggest that researchers should be a little less 
optimistic about the direct impact and effect size of the arousability-by-stimulation interaction 
effect on training outcomes. Future studies should instead explore the interaction’s influence on 
moderators, such as mental workload, and more clearly determine how the components of 
arousability individually, and collectively, influence dependent variables. 
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APPENDIX B: INFORMED CONSENT FORMS  
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Study 1 
Dear Participant: 
 
We are conducting a research study to learn about how different people react to stress and distractions. 
You will be asked to complete three (3) questionnaires about stress and distractions. The questionnaires 
will take about one hour to complete.  
 
You may choose if you would like to be in the study and you may stop at any time without penalty. 
Information obtained during the course of the study will remain confidential, to the extent allowed by 
law. The results of the research study may be published, but your name will not be used. The only 
persons with access to the data are the researchers.  
 
This study may help provide more information about how some people deal with stress and respond to 
distractions. No compensation will be provided for participation in this project. However, the decision to 
give extra credit may be made by individual instructors. If you have any questions, please call me.  
 
All data will be analyzed without direct reference to the name or identity of the individual. Data files for 
each participant will be coded so that the identity of participants will be protected. All data will be 
secured in a computer database accessible only by password in the office of the researcher. Any hard 
copies of data will be kept in a locked file cabinet in the researcher’s office. Further, any information 
published in journal articles or presented at conferences will not reveal any participant names. 
 
Please call me at (407) 719-2234 or e-mail: jjvogelwalcutt@yahoo.com. You may also reach Dr. Denise 
Nicholson at (407) 882-1444 or email: dnichols@ist.ucf.edu. 
 
If you have questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have 
been placed at risk, you can contact the Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office 
of Research and Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL, 32826-3246 or by 
telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
 
Sincerely, 
Jennifer J. Vogel-Walcutt, Ph.D. 
Research Assistant 
 
 
 
I will participate in the above study.  
 
Participant’s Name:__________________________________________________________ 
 
Participant’s Signature _________________________________ (Date) ________________ 
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Study 2 
Dear Participant: 
 
We are conducting a research study to learn how different people react to stress and distractions during 
training. You will be asked to complete a series of two (3) questionnaires about stress and distractions, 
two (2) questionnaires about training, and one concept mapping exercise. Overall, the experiment will 
take about one-and-a-half hours to complete.  
 
You may choose if you would like to be in the study, and you may stop at any time without penalty. 
Information obtained during the course of the study will remain confidential, to the extent allowed by 
law. The results of the research study may be published, but your name will not be used. The only 
persons with access to the data are the researchers.  
 
This study may help provide more information about how some people deal with stress and respond to 
distractions. No compensation will be provided for participation in this project. However, the decision to 
give extra credit may be made by individual instructors. If you have any questions, please call me.  
 
All data will be analyzed without direct reference to the name or identity of the individual. Data files for 
each participant will be coded so that the identity of participants will be protected. All data will be 
secured in a computer database accessible only by password in the office of the researcher. Any hard 
copies of data will be kept in a locked file cabinet in the researcher’s office. Further, any information 
published in journal articles or presented at conferences will not reveal any participant names. 
 
Please call me at (407) 719-2234 or e-mail: jjvogelwalcutt@yahoo.com. You may also reach Dr. Denise 
Nicholson at (407) 882-1444 or email: dnichols@ist.ucf.edu. 
 
If you have questions about your rights as a subject/participant in this research, or if you feel you have 
been placed at risk, you can contact the Institutional Review Board, University of Central Florida, Office 
of Research and Commercialization, 12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501, Orlando, FL, 32826-3246 or by 
telephone at (407) 823-2901. 
 
Sincerely, 
Jennifer J. Vogel-Walcutt, Ph.D. 
Research Assistant 
 
 
 
I will participate in the above study.  
 
Participant’s Name:__________________________________________________________ 
 
Participant’s Signature _________________________________ (Date) ________________ 
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APPENDIX C: STUDY 2 BIOGRAPHIC INFORMATION FORM  
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1. Age _______ 
 
2. Gender (please circle)  a. Female  b. Male 
 
3. Race/Ethnicity (please circle one only): 
a. Caucasian b. Africa-
American 
c. Asian-
American 
d. Hispanic e. Other: 
_______________ 
 
4. SES/combined income of house hold (if known, please circle one only): 
a. $0-29,999 b. $30,000-59,999 c. $60,000-89,999 d. $90,000 + 
 
5. Marital status (please circle one only): 
a. Single b. Married c. Divorced d. Widowed e. Living with partner 
 
6. What is your current working status? (You may circle more than one
a. Staying at home 
.) 
b. Work full-time c. Work part-time d. Student e. Retired 
 
7. What is the highest degree that you have obtained? (Please circle one only.) 
a. Some High School b. High School Diploma c. Some College 
   
d. Bachelor’s Degree e. Some Graduate Experience f. Completed Graduate Degree 
 
8. What is your primary language? (Please circle one only.) 
a. English b. Spanish c. Other: __________________ 
 
9. What is your hand preference? (Please circle one only.) 
a. Right-Handed b. Left-Handed c. No Preference 
 
10. Do you require corrected vision? (Please circle one only.)  Yes No 
If so, do you wear glasses or contacts? (Please circle one only.)  Yes No 
And if so, are you wearing them now? (Please circle one only.)  Yes No 
 
11. Have you ever served in the military or ROTC? (Please circle one only.)  Yes No 
If so, with whom and when? _________________________________________________________ 
 
12. How often do you play video games (computer or console)? _____ hours/week 
 
13. How often are you on the computer? _____ hours/week 
 
14. How would you describe your degree-of-comfort with computers? (Please circle one only.) 
a. Poor b. Fair c. Average d. Above Average e. Proficient 
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APPENDIX D: STUDY 2 VERBATIM KNOWLEDGE QUESTIONNAIRE  
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Developed by Gebrim, Vogel-Walcutt, & Schatz (2007) 
 
1. In this simulation, what does FIST stand for? (Please circle one only.) 
a. Fire Support Team b. Fleet Imagery Support Terminal c. Fleet Initial Strike Team 
 
2. Which one of the following items would a FIST have at their disposal? (Please circle one only.) 
a. Anti-Aircraft b. Infantry c. Long-range cannons d. Tanks 
 
3. Which of the FIST members is responsible for each of the following activities/duties?  
 
1) Assigns each target to someone on the team.
a. FIST leader 
 (Please circle one only.) 
b. Forward air controller c. Forward observer artillery d. Forward observer mortars 
 
2) Communicates with supporting units that are very accurate, but limited by fuel capacity, ammunition capacity 
and weather conditions
a. FIST leader 
. (Please circle one only.) 
b. Forward air controller c. Forward observer artillery d. Forward observer mortars 
 
3) Communicates with supporting units that can shoot up to 30km.
a. FIST leader 
 (Please circle one only.) 
b. Forward air controller c. Forward observer artillery d. Forward observer mortars 
 
4) Communicates with supporting units that can shoot up to 5.5km.
a. FIST leader 
 (Please circle one only.) 
b. Forward air controller c. Forward observer artillery d. Forward observer mortars 
 
5) Coordinates the battle plan.
a. FIST leader 
 (Please circle one only.) 
b. Forward air controller c. Forward observer artillery d. Forward observer mortars 
 
6) Determines the order in which targets will be destroyed
a. FIST leader 
. (Please circle one only.) 
b. Forward air controller c. Forward observer artillery d. Forward observer mortars 
 
7) Determines which ammunitions to use.
a. FIST leader 
 (Please circle one only.) 
b. Forward air controller c. Forward observer artillery d. Forward observer mortars 
 
8) Determines which targets to attack.
a. FIST leader 
 (Please circle one only.) 
b. Forward air controller c. Forward observer artillery d. Forward observer mortars 
 
9) Makes sure that none of our units are hit by friendly fire
a. FIST leader 
. (Please circle one only.) 
b. Forward air controller c. Forward observer artillery d. Forward observer mortars 
4. In this simulation, what role will you be playing? (Please circle one only.) 
a. FIST leader b. Forward air controller c. Forward observer artillery d. Forward observer mortars 
 
5. In this simulation, what will your main task be? (Please circle one only.) 
_____ a. Alert forces in the air and on land to begin combat. 
_____ b. Request air support to destroy enemy forces. 
_____ c. Request cannon fire to disable the enemy forces. 
_____ d. Request tank support to slow down enemy forces. 
 
6. In this simulation, which three (3) of the following will you have to do in order to accomplish your main 
task? (Please circle three
 
.) 
_____ a. Communicate the positions and types of enemy units. 
_____ b. Follow enemy units. 
_____ c. Identify enemy units. 
_____ d. Locate enemy units. 
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_____ e. Shoot at enemy units. 
_____ f. Surround enemy units. 
 
7. In this simulation, what is the communication process called? (Please circle one only.) 
a. Aim for Fire (AFF) b. Call for Fire (CFF) c. Fire at Target (FAT) d. Fire at Will (FAW) 
 
8. In this simulation, which piece of equipment would you use to do each of the following tasks? 
 
1) Figure out the coordinates of your location.
a. Binoculars 
 (Please circle one only.) 
b. Clipboard c. Compass d. GPS e. Map f. Radio g. Rangefinder 
 
2) Figure out a target’s distance from you.
a. Binoculars 
 (Please circle one only.) 
b. Clipboard c. Compass d. GPS e. Map f. Radio g. Rangefinder 
 
3) Figure out in which direction a target is located.
a. Binoculars 
 (Please circle one only.) 
b. Clipboard c. Compass d. GPS e. Map f. Radio g. Rangefinder 
 
4) Inform your location to your support team.
a. Binoculars 
 (Please circle one only.) 
b. Clipboard c. Compass d. GPS e. Map f. Radio g. Rangefinder 
 
5) Inform a target’s location to your support team
a. Binoculars 
. (Please circle one only.) 
b. Clipboard c. Compass d. GPS e. Map f. Radio g. Rangefinder 
 
6) Inform your support team on how to attack an enemy unit.
a. Binoculars 
 (Please circle one only.) 
b. Clipboard c. Compass d. GPS e. Map f. Radio g. Rangefinder 
 
9. In this simulation, which three (3) pieces of equipment will you need to use? (Please circle three
a. Binoculars 
.) 
b. Clipboard c. Compass d. GPS e. Map f. Radio g. Rangefinder 
 
 
 
PROCEDURAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
1. What is the order of events that a FIST member must follow to successfully perform his task? (Please 
enumerate from 1 to 4
_____ a. Confirm the plan with his support team by having them repeat it back. 
.) 
_____ b. Determine the target’s exact location. 
_____ c. Tell his support team about the FIST leader’s timeline. 
_____ d. Tell his support team the exact location of the target. 
 
2. In this simulation, what order of events do you have to follow? (Please enumerate from 1 to 8
_____ a. Call your support team. 
.) 
_____ b. Figure out a target’s coordinates. 
_____ c. Figure out your coordinates. 
_____ d. Transmit a target’s coordinates to your support team. 
_____ e. Transmit Danger Close, Trajectory and Splash information to your support team. 
_____ f. Transmit Target Description, Method of Engagement and Method of Control to your support team. 
_____ g. Transmit Warning Order and Location Method to your support team. 
_____ h. Transmit your coordinates to your support team. 
 
3. In this simulation, which is the first piece of equipment you have to use? (Please circle one only.) 
a. Binoculars b. Clipboard c. Compass d. GPS e. Map f. Radio g. Rangefinder 
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4. In this simulation, which is the second piece of equipment you have to use? (Please circle one only.) 
 
a. Binoculars b. Clipboard c. Compass d. GPS e. Map f. Radio g. Rangefinder 
 
5. In this simulation, which is the third piece of equipment you have to use? (Please circle one only.) 
 
a. Binoculars b. Clipboard c. Compass d. GPS e. Map f. Radio g. Rangefinder 
 
6. In this simulation, what is the earliest time when you can declare End of Mission? 
a. It’s the first thing that should be done. 
b. Right after transmitting a target’s coordinates. 
c. Right after transmitting Danger Close, Trajectory, and Splash. 
d. Right after transmitting the Location Method (‘Polar’). 
e. Right after transmitting the Method of Control (‘When Ready’). 
f. Right after transmitting your position. 
g. Right after your support team fires. 
 
7. In this simulation, when will your support team fire? 
a. It’s the first thing that should happen. 
b. Right after declaring the End of Mission. 
c. Right after transmitting a target’s coordinates. 
d. Right after transmitting Danger Close, Trajectory, and Splash. 
e. Right after transmitting the Location Method (‘Polar’). 
f. Right after transmitting the Method of Control (‘When Ready’). 
g. Right after transmitting your position. 
 
8. In this simulation, how will you transmit your position to your support team? 
a. Click on the Binoculars, left click to figure out the direction, right click to figure out the distance, click on the 
radio, select the agency you’d like to talk to, enter the digits from the Binoculars, and click on ‘k’. 
b. Click on the Compass, right click to figure out the direction, click on the radio, select the agency you’d like to 
talk to, enter the digits from the Compass, and click on ‘k’. 
c. Click on the GPS, click on the radio, select the agency you’d like to talk to, enter the red digits from the GPS, 
and click on ‘k’. 
d. Click on the Map, right click to figure out the direction, left click to figure out the distance, click on the radio, 
select the agency you’d like to talk to, enter the digits from the Map, and click on ‘k’. 
e. Click on the Rangefinder, left click to figure out the direction, right click to figure out the distance, click on the 
radio, select the agency you’d like to talk to, enter the digits from the Rangefinder, and click on ‘k’. 
 
9. In this simulation, what is the right time to transmit your position to your support team? 
a. It’s the first thing that should be done. 
b. Right after declaring the End of Mission. 
c. Right after transmitting a target’s coordinates. 
d. Right after transmitting Danger Close, Trajectory, and Splash. 
e. Right after transmitting the Location Method (‘Polar’). 
f. Right after transmitting the Method of Control (‘When Ready’). 
g. Right after your support team fires. 
 
10. In this simulation, how will you transmit a target’s coordinates to your support team? 
a. Using the Binoculars, left click to figure out the direction, right click to figure out the distance, click on the 
radio, select the agency you’d like to talk to, enter the digits from the Binoculars, and click on ‘k’. 
b. Using the Compass, right click to figure out the direction, click on the radio, select the agency you’d like to talk 
to, enter the digits from the Compass, and click on ‘k’. 
c. Using the GPS, click on the radio, select the agency you’d like to talk to, enter the red digits from the GPS, and 
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click on ‘k’. 
d. Using the Map, right click to figure out the direction, left click to figure out the distance, click on the radio, 
select the agency you’d like to talk to, enter the digits from the Map, and click on ‘k’. 
e. Using the Rangefinder, left click to figure out the direction, right click to figure out the distance, click on the 
radio, select the agency you’d like to talk to, enter the digits from the Rangefinder, and click on ‘k’. 
 
11. In this simulation, what is the right time to transmit a target’s coordinates to your support team? 
a. It’s the first thing that should be done. 
b. Right after declaring the End of Mission. 
c. Right after transmitting Danger Close, Trajectory, and Splash. 
d. Right after transmitting the Location Method (‘Polar’). 
e. Right after transmitting the Method of Control (‘When Ready’). 
f. Right after transmitting your position. 
g. Right after your support team fires. 
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How confident do you feel in this answer: 
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
very  
strongly 
unconfident 
strongly 
unconfident 
moderately 
unconfident 
slightly 
unconfident 
neither 
confident 
nor 
unconfident 
slightly 
confident 
moderately 
confident 
strongly 
confident 
very 
strongly 
confident 
 
1. Why do you think it is important for the Forward Observer Artillery to know what the Close Air 
Support unit is doing?  
On a scale of -4 (very strongly unconfident) to +4 (very strongly confident) how confident are you in the 
accuracy of your answer? 
 
2. Mortar teams are more exposed, use smaller-caliber munitions, and do less damage than 
Artillery teams. But Mortar teams serve an important purpose, what do you think that is? 
On a scale of -4 (very strongly unconfident) to +4 (very strongly confident) how confident are you in the 
accuracy of your answer? 
 
3. Why do think its important for the Forward Observer Artillery to tell his supporting unit 
whether to use a high or low arching trajectory? 
On a scale of -4 (very strongly unconfident) to +4 (very strongly confident) how confident are you in the 
accuracy of your answer? 
 
4. If an enemy tank is rapidly approaching the FiST team, which type of munitions would be best to 
use against it? Why? 
On a scale of -4 (very strongly unconfident) to +4 (very strongly confident) how confident are you in the 
accuracy of your answer? 
 
5. Why is a FiST team necessary? Why don’t the supporting units simply fire in the direction of the 
enemy? 
On a scale of -4 (very strongly unconfident) to +4 (very strongly confident) how confident are you in the 
accuracy of your answer? 
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Study 1 
Debrief 
Screening Ability: A Meta-Analysis 
Thank you for participating in this research study. This study was conducted so that we may combine the 
current questionnaires used to study screening ability into one improved and shortened version. In the 
future, we hope to use this scale with military recruits to determine if different educational strategies 
would be beneficial for those with low versus high screening abilities. If you would like more information 
about this study or questionnaire, please feel free to contact us at any time: 
 Clint Bowers, Ph.D., phone 407-823-1733, or bowers@mail.ucf.edu  
Jennifer Vogel-Walcutt, phone 407-882-1366, or jvogel@mail.ucf.edu 
Study 2 
Debrief 
Trait Arousability and Training Performance 
Thank you for participating in this research study. This study was conducted so that we may examine the 
ways different people react to over-stimulating (or “distracting”) training situations. In the future, we 
hope use the results from this study to help train military recruits more effectively and efficiently. If you 
would like more information about this study or questionnaire, please feel free to contact us at any time: 
 Clint Bowers, Ph.D., phone 407-823-1733, or bowers@mail.ucf.edu  
Jennifer Vogel-Walcutt, phone 407-882-1366, or jvogel@mail.ucf.edu 
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